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No. 20070197

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PAUL HOUGHTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Petitioners and Appellants,
vs.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE OFFICE OF RECOVERY
SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND
STATE OF UTAH, et al,
Defendants/Respondents and Appellees.

APPELLEES' BRIEF

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from orders of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (West 2004). On May
29, 2007, this Court entered an order that provisionally granted
Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal from the trial court's Order
on Motion for Decertification (Decertification Order).

ISSUES PRESENTED
I. T i m e l i n e s s o f P e t i t i o n
The trial court entered the Decertification

Order on December 22,

2006. After the twenty-day time period for a petition for interlocutory
appeal expired, the trial court entered a minute entry stating t h a t the
order was "provisional." In a February 2007 order, the trial court said
that the Decertification

Order was now "final," but made no changes or

modifications to it. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the
Decertification
A.

Order?

Standard

of review

This issue requires no review of the lower court decision; thus, no
standard of review applies.
B.

Preservation of issue

This issue is unique to the interlocutory appeal; thus, the
preservation requirement does not apply.

II. C l a s s D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n
U t a h R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires t h a t questions of law and fact
t h a t are common to class members predominate over those questions

-2-

affecting only individual members. The trial court ruled t h a t the
calculation of the attorney fees amount the State must pay to Medicaid
recipients destroyed the predominance of common questions due to the
fact-intensive inquiries into each member's individual case. Did the
* trial court err by decertifying the class?
A

Standard

of review

Whether to certify or decertify a class is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Richardson

v. Ariz. Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d

636, 639 (Utah 1980).
B.

Preservation of issue

Defendants raised this issue in their Motion for Decertification

of

Class Action Status, R. 1293-95, and in their Renewed Motion for
Decertification of Class Action Status, R. 2087-88. The trial court
entered the Decertification

Order on December 22, 2006. R. 4194-4248.

Plaintiffs filed a petition for interlocutory review on March 7, 2007.
And this Court provisionally granted the petition on May 29, 2007. R.
4319-21.

-3-

III. "Related Questions" of Class Criteria and Discovery
The Court did not accept either of Plaintiffs' "Related Questions"
when it provisionally granted Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory
appeal. But in any event, the "related questions" have already been
addressed. This Court set out the elements of an attorney fees claim
under U t a h Code Ann. § 26-19-7 in Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2005
UT 63, ^l 51, 125 P.3d 860. And the trial court ordered the State to
provide Plaintiffs with "all third party liability case files from November
1, 1994 to present where the Medicaid recipient was represented by a
private attorney and the State satisfied its lien." R. 2165. Should this
Court address the two "Related Questions?"
A.

Standard

of review

Neither of those two issues is properly before the Court, nor does
either require review of the lower court's decision. Thus, no standard of
review applies.
B.

Preservation of issue

Neither of those two issues is properly before the Court. Nor did
Plaintiffs preserve the issues for interlocutory appeal.

-4-

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Utah R. App. P. 5 and Utah R. Civ. P. 23 are attached as addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West 2004) is attached as addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arises from Plaintiffs' suit against the Department of
Health, other state agencies, and two individual defendants alleging
that Utah's Medicaid lien statute, U t a h Code Ann. § 26-19-5(1), violated
federal law. Class certification was granted early in the proceedings.
During the course of this lawsuit, this Court determined that
Utah's lien statute did not violate federal law. See S.S. v. State of Utah,
972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998); Wallace v. Estate ofNichole Jackson, 972 P.2d
446 (Utah 1998). This Court also determined t h a t Medicaid recipients
could recover attorney fees from the State unless the State satisfied its
lien through its own efforts. See State of Utah v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39,
999 P.2d 572; Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860
(Houghton

III).

-5-

Following Houghton IIly the State renewed its earlier motion to
decertify the class. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and argued t h a t the
State must pay a fee of 33% in every case where the recipient asked for
the State's consent, whether or not the State already paid a fee or
discounted its lien.
After briefing and argument, the trial court rejected Plaintiffs'
argument t h a t contingency fees are always 33% of the recovery and also
t h a t the proper amount of fees the State must pay could be calculated by
a simple mathematical formula. 1 Instead, the court ruled t h a t each
recipient will have to prove the appropriate amount of fees owed. Based
on t h a t conclusion, the trial court ruled t h a t the Rule 23 criteria for
class actions was not satisfied and decertified the class.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint

on October 27, 1995, alleging t h a t

Utah's Medicaid lien statute violated federal law. R. 1-47. The trial
court certified two classes on J a n u a r y 29, 1996. R. 98-101. On

1

That formula would require the State to pay the recipient 33%
of its recovery to reimburse the recipient for the attorney fees t h a t the
recipient paid his or her attorney.
-6-

December 22, 2006, after all the claims, except one, had been dismissed,
the trial court decertified the class. R. 4194-4248 {Decertification Order).
After the twenty-day deadline to file an interlocutory appeal, the
trial court entered a minute entry that said the Decertification Order
4

was "provisional." R. 4254. On February 15, 2007, the trial court
entered an order that did not change or modify the Decertification
Order, but that said it was now "final." R. 4291-95. Plaintiffs filed a
direct appeal of the Decertification Order on March 19, 2007 (Appellate
Docket No. 20070252). R. 4300-01. That appeal was dismissed on June
20,2007.
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) motion to certify the
Decertification Order on March 29, 2007. R. 4307& 4312-15. Plaintiffs
filed their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on March 7, 2007, and this
Court provisionally granted permission to appeal on May 29, 2007. R.
4319-21.

STATEMENT OF F A C T S
On October 27, 1995, four named plaintiffs sued the Department
of Health, the Office of Recovery Services, the Department of Human
Services, the State of Utah and two individual defendants for civil rights
-7-

and other claims alleging t h a t Utah's Medicaid lien statute violated
federal law. R. 1-6, 22, 24-25, 32-47.
On J a n u a r y 29, 1996, the trial court certified two classes in the
case. The court noted t h a t the common question of law or fact to the
classes was "whether or not the State of U t a h violated federal law in
asserting liens on claims, settlements and judgments of class members
to reimburse itself for Medicaid assistance paid." R. 98-101.
Subsequently, the State moved for judgment on the pleadings
based on two 1998 U t a h Supreme Court decisions t h a t held t h a t the
lien statute did not violate federal law. R. 430-31. The trial court
denied t h a t motion, R. 494-95, and the litigation continued. In 2002,
this Court extinguished the claims of one of the classes and stated t h a t
the only remaining claim was an implied cause of action for attorney
fees. Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067 {Houghton
II). On remand, Judge Ronald E. Nehring, the presiding judge at the
time, expressed his opinion t h a t attorney fees in each third-party
liability case would have to be determined on the merits and t h a t it
would be a "fact intensive enterprise." R. 1310-22 & 1798 {Transcript of
04/28/2003

Hearing, pp. 86-87).

-8-

The statute governing payment of attorney fees during most of the
relevant time period, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West 2004), 2 did not
require the State to pay the same attorney fees in every case. R. 4210.
In 2000, this Court determined t h a t the State was required to pay
reasonable attorney fees if it satisfied its lien from the proceeds
procured by the recipient's attorney. McCoy, 2000 UT 39 at H19.
The State filed its first motion to decertify the class in 2003. R.
1293-95. That motion was stayed during Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal
over discovery issues. Houghton III, 2005 UT 63. In December 2005,
this Court issued Houghton III, which outlined the elements of a McCoy
attorney fees claim, and the case was remanded. R. 1971-94. After
remand, the State renewed its motion to decertify in February 2006. R.
2087-88.
In an attempt to determine whether the case should continue as a
class action, the trial court ordered the State to produce one hundred
third-party liability case files. R. 2047-50, 4337. Those files did not
2

The relevant statutory language provided:

(4) The department m a y n o t pay more than 33% of its total recovery
for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in
an action that is commenced with the department's written consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (West 2004).
-9-

provide enough information to determine whether the class met the
requirements for continued certification. R. 2163. Plaintiffs asked the
trial court for access to more of the files, and the trial court ordered the
State to produce "all third party liability case files from November 1,
1994 to present where the Medicaid recipient was represented by a
private attorney and the State satisfied its lien." R. 2165.
In compliance with t h a t order, between J u n e 15 and July 10, 2006,
the State produced 2,785 third-party liability case files for Plaintiffs to
inspect and copy. R. 2288, 2783-93, 2799 & 2812. Plaintiffs had
unlimited access to the 2,785 case files; their inspection team consisted
of up to five individuals who were allowed complete access to inspect,
copy, or scan any files they chose. R. 2783-93 & 3858-59. The process
concluded only when Plaintiffs were finished inspecting, copying and
scanning the files they chose. R. 3859.
Ultimately, Plaintiffs chose to copy or scan only 412 case files. R.
2812. The files fall into the following categories: 1) Potential

Houghton

III cases where consent was requested and denied (28 cases), R. 2812 &
2830-3356; and 2) cases t h a t do not have the Houghton III elements for
a McCoy attorney fee claim (384 cases). Those cases lacking the
elements can be broken down as follows: a) consent was granted and an
-10-

attorney fee paid or discount given (314 cases); b) no request for consent
was made (31 cases); c) the recipient did not have an attorney (19 cases);
d) there was no-fault insurance coverage, for which attorney
representation was unnecessary (11 cases); e) the recipient's attorney
declined to enter into a collection agreement (4 cases); and f) cases that
could not be categorized by the case notes alone (5 cases). R. 2812-19,
3859 & 4168-4182. The information necessary to determine potential
recipients who may have a McCoy attorney fees claim is contained in the
electronic files. R. 2830-3350.
Plaintiffs submitted affidavits to the trial court stating that, in
Salt Lake City, attorney fees for personal injury cases are typically onethird of the gross recovery but t h a t attorneys occasionally take a lower
or higher fee depending upon the circumstances of the case. R. 3779-80
(Affidavit of Colin P. King, pp. 2-3) & 3785-86 (Affidavit ofG.
Sullivan,

Steven

pp. 2-3). The trial judge noted that in his experience, the

percentage of attorney fees in a personal injury case is often "25% or
some other percentage than 33%" and that a 33% fee "is not so prevalent
that a presumption of 33% should be given." R. 4210 & 4236
(Decertification Order, p. 17, n.7 & p. 43, n.19).

-11-

The governing statute, U t a h Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West 2004),
granted the State discretion to determine an attorney fee, but prohibited
the State from paying more t h a n 33%. R. 2827 & 4210. The State
considered a number of factors in determining the attorney fees to be
paid, including: a) whether the recipient requested the State's consent to
represent its interest; b) whether the recipient's attorney cooperated
with the State; c) the underlying basis and n a t u r e of the third-party
liability claim; d) whether liability was contested; e) whether causation
was contested; f) whether there were damages issues involved; g) the
amount of the Medicaid lien; h) the amount of the recipient's recovery; i)
whether suit was filed; and j) whether the State could have procured
reimbursement itself with little or no effort. R. 2827-28 {Affidavit of
Brent Perry, %8). After their inspection of the 2,785 third-party liability
case files, Plaintiffs conceded t h a t the State granted consent and paid
attorney fees or discounted its lien 3 in the "overwhelming number of
cases." R. 3470 & 3484.

3

In cases where the State discounted its lien, the recipient
received a larger portion of the settlement and was therefore
reimbursed for the State's part of the attorney fees that the recipient
paid to the attorney.
-12-

When discovery was complete, the trial court allowed
supplemental briefing on the decertification motion. R. 2807-3356.
After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered the
Decertification

Order on December 22, 2006. R. 4194-4248. Plaintiffs'

counsel sent the trial judge a letter on J a n u a r y 9, 2007, expressing his
uncertainty regarding the correct time to appeal. R. 4249-50. On
J a n u a r y 12, 2007, after the twenty-day time period to seek permission to
file an interlocutory appeal expired, the trial court entered a minute
entry stating t h a t the Decertification

Order should be considered

"provisional." R. 4254.
In the months before the Decertification

Order, Plaintiffs filed

numerous other motions in the case. 4 None are relevant to this appeal,
and one remains pending before the trial court. R. 2207-09, 2660-61,
2672-74, 2677-82, 2755-57, 3371-72. 5
4

Those motions include: 1) motions to amend the complaint and
to reinstate claims of Class I and Class II Plaintiffs; 2) for attorney fees;
3) for prejudgment interest; 4) for sanctions for spoliation of evidence
and 5) for the trial court to find that Plaintiffs' claims are equitable in
nature.
5

Plaintiffs spend considerable amount of time arguing that the
State has destroyed evidence t h a t is crucial to them. But Plaintiffs
have never shown that the hard copy files are the exclusive source of
the evidence necessary to establish the Houghton III elements. R.
2798-99 Importantly, the information recorded in the case files was not
-13-

Following a J a n u a r y 2007 oral argument on Plaintiffs' various
other motions, the trial court directed the State's counsel to prepare the
court's order on those motions. R. 4337. At no time did the State or its
counsel "assure" Plaintiffs or their counsel t h a t the character of the
Decertification
01123/2007

Order could be changed. R. 4337 {Transcript of

Hearing, pp. 62-63).

On February 15, 2007, the trial court signed the prepared order.
The order did not change or modify the Decertification
stated that the Decertification

Order, but it

Order was now "final." R. 4291-95.

Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on March 19, 2007 (Appellate
Docket No. 20070252). R. 4300-01. That appeal was dismissed on J u n e
20, 2007. The trial court denied Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) motion to certify
the Decertification

Order on March 29, 2007. R. 4307& 4312-15.

Plaintiffs filed their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on March 7,
2007, and this Court provisionally granted permission to appeal on May
29,2007. R. 4319-21.

recorded in anticipation of or intended to address the issues in either
the McCoy or Houghton III decisions. In the few cases where the
Houghton III elements cannot be determined from the electronic files,
other sources of information will likely be available to prove or disprove
the elements. The alleged evidence destruction is not relevant to the
issues currently before the Court.
-14-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because Plaintiffs'
petition for interlocutory appeal was untimely. The trial court entered
the Decertification

Order on December 22, 2006. After the twenty-day

period to file a petition for interlocutory appeal expired, the trial court
entered a minute entry stating t h a t order was "provisional." Then in
February 2007, the trial court entered an order stating that the
Decertification

Order was now "final." But that February order did not

change or modify the Decertification

Order, and therefore, it did not

enlarge the time for Plaintiffs to file their petition for interlocutory
review of the Decertification

Order.

Next, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
decertified the class. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the factual and legal
issues that are common to the class "predominate" over issues that
affect only individual class members. Here, the calculation of the proper
amount of attorney fees that the State is obligated to pay Medicaid
recipients is too case-specific for the common questions to predominate.
The trial court cannot calculate the fee amounts by applying a simple
mathematical formula because the governing statute does not allow it.
The State had broad discretion to determine a fee, and did so based on a
-15-

variety of factors. Necessarily then, the fee calculation will result in a
series of mini-trials, which defeats the judicial economy class actions
provide. The trial court properly applied the Rule 23 criteria to the facts
of the case, and its decision to decertify the class should not be disturbed
because the decision did not exceed the trial court's discretion.
Last, Plaintiffs' two "Related Questions" should be ignored.
Neither was accepted by the Court for interlocutory review. Even if they
had been, it is not necessary to address either question. First, the
Houghton III court clearly set out the elements of a McCoy attorney fees
claim. Second, Plaintiffs' access to the 2,785 third-party liability files
was not limited. After initially allowing Plaintiffs access to only one
hundred of the files, the trial court ordered the State to give Plaintiffs
access to all of the files. Plaintiffs' inspection team was free to inspect,
copy or scan any files it wanted and ultimately chose to copy only 412
files.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over the Untimely
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.
Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal was untimely, and

therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the
-16-

Decertification

Order. Plaintiffs argue first that the trial court's minute

entry, stating that the December order was "provisional," was entered
within the twenty-day time period because of the additional three-day
mailing time provided by Utah R. App. P. 22.(d). Plaintiffs are wrong.
Rule 22(d) extends time only when the party "is required or permitted to
do an act within a prescribed period after service of a paper and the
paper is served by mail." (Emphasis added). In other words, Rule 22
extends the time to act when the time runs from the service of the
particular paper. But U t a h R. App. 5 is clear t h a t a petition must be
filed twenty days after entry of the order. Rule 22(d) does not apply
here. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 521 (Utah App. 1989);
Carsten v. Carsten, 2006 WL 1791391 (Utah App.) (Attached as part of
addendum C). The twenty-day period for Plaintiffs to file their petition
for interlocutory appeal expired on J a n u a r y 11, 2007, not on January 16,
2007, as Plaintiffs assert.
Under Rule 5's plain language, this Court lacks jurisdiction over
this appeal because it was untimely filed. The trial judge signed the
Decertification

Order on December 22, 2006, and the docket shows that
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the clerk entered the order on the same day. 6 R. 4194-4248. The "entry
of the order" occurred, therefore, on December 22, 2006 See U t a h R. Civ.
P. 58A(c). Rule 5(a) requires a petition to be filed within twenty days
after the entry of the order. Applying Rule 5 here required Plaintiffs to
file their petition within twenty days of December 22, 2006.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs could have moved the trial court for an
extension of time before the expiration of the twenty days. Plaintiffs did
neither.
Instead, two days before the deadline, Plaintiffs' counsel faxed a
letter to the trial judge, expressing his uncertainty regarding the correct
time to appeal. R. 4249-50. On J a n u a r y 12, 2007, after expiration of
the time, the trial court recharacterized the Decertification

Order in a

minute entry stating that it "should be considered provisional." At a
hearing in J a n u a r y 2007, the court directed the State's attorney to
prepare an order stating, in part, t h a t the Decertification

Order "is now

a final order." The order was signed on February 15, 2007.
The confusion arises because Plaintiffs appeal the December
Decertification

Order on its merits, arguing t h a t it was not "final" until

6

Although it would be expected to see the clerk's date-stamp on
the original Decertification Order, one is not there. But, the entry date
of December 22, 2006, appears on the court's docket.
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February 2007. This Court's order provisionally granting permission for
this interlocutory appeal observed that the February order made no
changes to the Decertification

Order.

Plaintiffs argue t h a t the order

was modified because it changed from a "provisional" order to a "final"
order. That argument should fail. First, interlocutory orders are always
subject to change and, accordingly, can never be considered "final" in the
proper legal sense. 7
Second, this Court has rejected similar arguments in cases
involving an amended judgment. "Where a belated entry merely
constitutes an amendment or modification not changing the substance
or character of the judgment, such entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry
which relates back to the time the original judgment was entered, and
does not enlarge the time for appeal. . . ." State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, f
7

An interlocutory order, by definition, is never "final" in the
legal sense. For purposes of appeal, a final order "ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment." Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631, 632 (Utah 1987); Anderson
u. Wilshire Investments Corp., 2005 UT 59, %9, 123 P.3d 393; Loffredo v.
Holt, 2001 UT 97, f 12, 37 P.3d 1070. The Decertification Order can not
become "final" until judgment is entered in the case. This distinction is
important because the trial court's February order declaring the
Decertification Order "final" did not change the legal character of the
Decertification Order. Because the later order neither changed nor
modified the Decertification Order, it is difficult to see how the
February order could have had any legal effect on the Decertification
Order.
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11, 106 P.3d 729; Beddoes u. Giffin, 2007 UT 35, f 12, 158 P.2d 1102;
Promax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, f 12, 998 P.2d 254; Adamson
Brockbank,

v.

112 U t a h 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). The key issue is whether

the trial court made material modifications to the order. For example,
in Garner, a notation on the judgment t h a t the defendant's plea was
conditional was not material, and the time for appeal was not enlarged.
2005 UT 6 at % 11. In Promax Development,

the subsequent change in

the judgment t h a t entered an award of attorney fees was material and
did enlarge the time for appeal. 2000 UT 4 at f 12. Here, the
Decertification

Order was neither changed nor modified. Thus, the entry

of the February order did not enlarge the time for interlocutory appeal of
the Decertification

Order.

Plaintiffs' attempt to have the Court review the merits of the
Decertification

Order through the February order should fail. The

situation is analogous to the Court's jurisprudence governing appeals
from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. On
appeal, appellate courts will consider only the trial court's decision to
grant or deny relief from judgment, and will not consider the merits of
the case. See Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, fl 11, 104 P.3d 1198; Lange v.
Eby, 2006 UT App. 118, f7, 133 P.3d 451; Franklin
-20-

Covey Client

Sales,

Inc. v. Meluin, 2000 UT App. 110, f 19, 23, 2 R 3 d 451. Following t h a t
reasoning, because the merits of the Decertification

Order were not

modified or altered by the February order, Plaintiffs were required to
appeal the Decertification Order itself in order for this Court to review it
on the merits. Because Plaintiffs did not timely file their petition for
interlocutory review of the Decertification

Order, the Court lacks

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 8
Plaintiffs argue that the appeal should be allowed for equitable
reasons. See Appellants' Brief at p. 17. Although equity does not support
Plaintiffs' argument, 9 the Court cannot hear a case for equitable reasons
8

The decision in Code v. Dep't of Health, 2007 UT 43, \ \ 8-9, 162
P.3d 1097, does not control this issue. Code states t h a t in order to
trigger the time to file an appeal, the prevailing party must submit an
order or the court must give the parties explicit direction that no order
is required. Id. The rule does not apply here because the appeal in
Code was taken from a final order instead of an interlocutory one.
Code's intention is to avoid barring a person's rights to a final appeal.
Here, Plaintiffs will not lose the right to appeal at the end of the case.
Apparently recognizing the inapplicability of Code, Plaintiffs do not
even mention it.
9

Plaintiffs claim t h a t they relied on defense counsel's "assurance"
t h a t the December 22 order was not final. But neither the State nor its
counsel ever assured Plaintiffs their petition was timely or that the
character of the December order could be changed. The only reference
to any "assurance" by defense counsel is that the State's counsel
prepared the February 15, 2007 order, as requested by the trial court.
It would not have been proper for the State to include its disagreement
with the trial court's conclusion that the December order was now
-21-

if it does not have jurisdiction in the first instance. See, e.g., Crump v.
Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Utah App. 1991); see generally 5 C. Wright
& A. Miller Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (1969). U t a h R. App.
P. 2 allows the appellate court to suspend the appellate rules'
requirements on its own motion or when extraordinary cause is shown
in a particular case, except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e),
5(a), 48, 52, and 59. The advisory committee note explicitly states t h a t
those provisions establish "procedures and time limits t h a t confer
jurisdiction upon the court." Because Rule 5(a) prohibits this Court
from asserting jurisdiction over this case, the Court should not reach the
merits of the appeal. Likewise, because Rule 2 specifically prohibits this
Court from suspending or modifying Rule 5(a)'s requirements, the Court
cannot allow this appeal for equitable reasons. See Peres-Llamas

v.

Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, f 11, 110 P.3d 706 (Rule 2 cannot
extend time to file an appeal); Dent v. Dent, 2005 UT App. 568, f 7, 127
P.3d 1292 (same).
Finally, policy favors adhering to a strict time limit for
interlocutory appeals. This Court has suggested that, in general,

"final" in the February order its counsel prepared. See also R. 4337
(Transcript of 0112312007 Hearing, pp. 62-63).
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interlocutory appeals should be avoided because "they present appellate
courts with multiple appeals involving narrow issues taken out of the
context of the whole case which slow down the final determination of the
matter." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commn,

814 P.2d 1099,

1101 (1991). Nonetheless, because there are circumstances when an
interlocutory appeal is necessary, Rule 5 imposes a strict, jurisdictional
time period for such appeals. The "purpose for the shorter time frame
for interlocutory appeals is the need to expedite the process and avoid
unnecessary delay in the pending litigation." Bayless v. Bayless, 580
N.E.2d 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
Ultimately, both the text of Rule 5 and its policy support the
conclusion t h a t the twenty-day time period should be strictly enforced.
Plaintiffs filed their petition after the time expired. They did not move
for an enlargement of the time, and the later order did not modify the
December Decertification

Order. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to

review it.
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II.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It
Decertified the Class.
The Court accepted, on interlocutory appeal, only the question of

whether the trial court erred by decertifying the class. Yet, Plaintiffs'
brief fails to discuss U t a h R. Civ. P. 23, which governs class actions, or
its application in connection with the Decertification

Order.

Plaintiffs

also fail to provide the Court with the proper standard of review. That
standard, abuse of discretion, is crucial to the analysis.
The question of whether to allow a suit to proceed as a class
action is one primarily for the trial court. "If the criteria of Rule 23 are
complied with, it is within the sound discretion of the district court to
determine whether a s u i t . . . should proceed as a class action."
Richardson,

614 P.2d at 639; see also Call v. City of West Jordan, 727

P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). The trial court has the same discretion to
decertify a class, and a class should be decertified if it no longer meets
the Rule 23 criteria. See Richardson,

614 P.2d at 639.

Only when the trial court's decision exceeds the "limits of
reasonability" will an appellate court find t h a t a trial court abused its
discretion, or more properly, exceeded the bounds of its discretion.
Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C., 2006 UT App. 305, f 25, 145 P.3d
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1146. Indeed, this Court has stated that an abuse of discretion will be
found only when "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by
the trial court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). In
other words, an "abuse of discretion occurs when a judicial
determination is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is not merely an
error of law or judgment, but an overriding of the law by the exercise of
manifestly unreasonable judgment." United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d
938, 943 (10 th Cir. 1987). When viewed in light of the required classaction criteria, the trial court's decision to decertify the class was not an
abuse of discretion.
Rule 23(a) provides the four initial requirements for all class
actions: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. In addition to those initial four 23(a) requirements,
Rule 23(b) provides two additional requirements for class certification. 10
First, the court must find t h a t common issues of law or fact
"predominate" over questions affecting only individual members.
Second, the court must find t h a t a class action is "superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

10

The parties have agreed that if the class is to continue, it must
be under Rule 23(b)(3). R. 98-101; R. 1307; R. 4228.
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controversy." Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Here, the trial court carefully applied the Rule 23 criteria to the
facts and rendered a well-reasoned and lengthy order that was well
within the bounds of the court's discretion. In fact, it would have been
an abuse of discretion not to decertify the class. This Court should
affirm the Decertification Order.
R u l e 23(b)(3)'s p r e d o m i n a n c e r e q u i r e m e n t .
The trial court assumed that the Rule 23(a) numerosity
requirement 11 was satisfied. R. 4230. So, the deciding class certification
factor12 is whether "the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members

" Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Satisfying Rule 23(b)(3)'s

predominance requirement is "far more demanding" than meeting the
Rule 23(a) commonality requirement. Achem Prods, v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 624 (1997)(construing the identical language of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23).

11

The State does not agree that numerosity is present. R. 2820-

21.
12

The parties have not disputed that class representatives have
typical claims or that they will adequately protect the interests of the
class. See Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) and (4).
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The remaining claim in the case is Plaintiff Medicaid recipients'
claim for attorney fees under U t a h Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (West 2004).
This Court recognized the claim in McCoy, 2000 UT 39 at f 20, and
defined the claim's elements in Houghton III.13 The State is liable to
contribute to the recipient's attorney fees, if the recipient proves: 1) an
attorney represented the recipient in a third-party liability claim; 2) the
recipient asked for consent to represent the State's interest in obtaining
recovery of amounts Medicaid paid on the recipient's behalf; 3) the State
denied consent; 4) the recipient obtained a recovery; and 5) the State
satisfied its Medicaid lien from the proceeds obtained by the recipient's
attorney. Thus, the resulting common questions t h a t must be answered
are the factual and legal ones t h a t define the McCoy claim.

13

The Houghton HI court defined the McCoy elements thus:
Under the general holding of McCoy, the State is obligated
to pay its share of a recipient's private attorney fees if
either (1) the State consents to the recipient's request to
represent its interest; or (2) the State satisfies its lien from
proceeds procured through the efforts of a recipient's
private attorney in those cases where the recipient
requested, but was denied, consent.

Houghton III, 2005 UT 63 at f 51. Both the McCoy and Houghton
III opinions are attached to the brief in Addendum C.
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First, the trial court correctly recognized that some cases will
require individual determinations about whether a private attorney
represented the Medicaid recipient. R. 4204. While in most cases that
is a simple question, there are some in which the attorney withdrew
from representation before the recipient and the liable third-party
reached a settlement. R.4232. In those cases, case-specific evidence
will be required to determine whether the State owes the recipient any
attorney fees.
Second, the trial court correctly recognized that some cases will
require individual questions about whether the recipient asked for the
State's consent. R. 4204-08. The parties strongly disagree about how
many of those cases there are. R. 2820-21 & 3471-76. The trial court
will have to receive evidence and make individual factual
determinations about consent in each of those disputed cases.
Third, the trial court correctly recognized and focused on the most
important question: the determination of attorney fees. R. 4209-22. The
appropriate amount of fees that the State owes to individual Medicaid
recipients cannot be calculated by a simple mathematical formula. And,
contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, nothing in the governing statute or
case law requires resort to a simple mathematical formula or an across-28-

the-board 33% for attorney fees. 14
During most of the relevant time period, the statute governing
payment of attorney fees gave the State discretion to fix an attorney fee,
but set a ceiling on the a m o u n t :
(4) The department m a y n o t pay more t h a n 33% of its total
recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate
share of the costs in an action t h a t is commenced with the
department's written consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West 2004) (emphasis added). The beginning
point in any question of statutory construction is the statute's plain
wording. Hall v. Dep't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, f 15, 24 P.3d 958; Chris &
Dicks Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah
1990). The legislature's use of the word "may" granted the State
discretion to determine the attorney fee to be paid in a given case. The
statute plainly says t h a t the State m a y pay 33%, and m a y pay less than
33%, but m a y n o t pay more t h a n 33%.
When construing statutes, courts routinely assume that the
legislature used each word advisedly. E.g., Grant v. Utah State Land

14

Judge Quinn rejected Plaintiffs' assertion that contingency fee
agreements are always 33%. He stated that, in his experience, the
percentage of attorney fees in personal injury is often "25% or some
other percentage than 33%" and t h a t a 33% fee "is not so prevalent that
a presumption of 33% should be given." R. 4210 & 4236
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Bd., 26 U t a h 2d 100, 102, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). Notably, the legislature
chose the word "may" in the first clause dealing with attorney fees, but
chose the word "shall" when dealing with costs after an action has been
filed. The discretion granted with the word "may" is made clear by its
juxtaposition to the word "shall." Jama v. Immigration
Enforcement,

& Customs

543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005). "May," in its most usual

meaning, does not import certainty. The words "shall" or "must" make
mandatory intention clear. Grant, 485 P.2d at 1036-37; see also Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294 n 26 (1981) ("may" expressly recognizes
substantial discretion); Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah
App. 1992) (under ordinary construction the word "may" means
permissive). Plaintiffs would have this Court exceed its power and
rewrite the statute to say t h a t the State "shall" pay 33% in all cases.
But this Court has "no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to
an intention not expressed." Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah
1995).
Moreover, the significance of "may" is also made clear by the 2005
amendment to § 26-19-7, which provides t h a t the State "shall pay
attorney's fees at the rate of 33.3% of the department's total recovery
and shall pay a proportionate share of the litigation expenses directly
-30-

related to the action." Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (West Supp. 2007). By
amendment, the legislature took away the State's discretion to fix an
attorney fee. That change in statutory language would not have been
necessary if, as Plaintiffs suggest, the statute's prior version required
the State to pay a fee of 33% in all cases.
The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The State
had authority to negotiate a fee up to 33% of its total recovery. The
negotiated fee was variable and depended upon many factors; each case
was considered on its own facts. R. 2826 {Affidavit of Brent Perry \ 8).
Thus, the calculation of the State's share of each recipient's attorney fee
will be as varied as each recipient's individual case. Therefore, the
common questions of law and fact do not predominate over the
individual case questions. Accordingly, the class was properly
decertified, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did
so.
Nothing in either the McCoy or Houghton III decisions requires a
different result. Nor do those cases demand t h a t the State pay a flat
33% fee in every case. McCoy held that the State was entitled to satisfy
its lien from the proceeds procured by the recipient's attorney, but it also
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held that, if the State did so, it was responsible to pay "reasonable''
attorney fees:
In sum, while the Act provides discretion to the State
when selecting a suitable avenue for recovering medical
assistance, each method of recovery requires the State to
pay its share of attorney fees. The State may (1) take
action directly against the third party, for which the
State pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to recipients
seeking to pursue the State's claim, whereby the State's
recovery will be reduced by r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y fees and,
if any, its proportionate share of the costs of an action;
or (3) refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after
the recipient recovers from the third party, in which case the
State's recovery shall be reduced by r e a s o n a b l e attorney fees.
McCoy, 2000 UT 39 at f 19 (emphasis added). Moreover, although the
precise amount of the State's claim was expressly discussed in the
decision ($8,846.92), the McCoy court neither deducted 33% for the
recipient's attorney fee, nor directed the trial court to do so. Instead, the
McCoy court remanded case to the trial court for a determination of the
"reasonable" attorney fees to be awarded:
We affirm the judgment of the trial court to the extent it
held t h a t the State is entitled to recover $8,846.92 from
McCoy, but reverse to the extent the court failed to reduce
the State's recovery by McCoy's r e a s o n a b l e attorney f e e s
for procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds.
We therefore r e m a n d for a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a t t o r n e y
fees to b e a w a r d e d McCoy and other appropriate action
consistent with this opinion.
Id. at f 20 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, Houghton III did not require the State to pay each
Medicaid recipient a 33% attorney fee. The Houghton III court sought
"to clarify the holding of McCoy as it relates to the scope of a discovery
order concerning potential class members." Houghton III, 2005 UT 63 at
\ 38. The Court stated that the question left open by McCoy was
"whether the State's obligation to pay its fair share of attorney fees is
limited to cases exactly like McCoy, where the recipient expressly
excluded the State's claim and the State recovered its lien directly from
the proceeds paid to the Medicaid recipient." Id. at f 41. Houghton

III

concluded t h a t a recipient's failure to expressly exclude the State's claim
did not impact the State's obligation to pay attorney fees:
We accordingly hold that the State's obligation to pay its
share of attorney fees is not dependent upon whether the recipient
expressly excluded the State's claim but, rather,
is dependent upon whether the recipient requested consent
and whether the State's recovery was attributable to the
efforts of the recipient's attorney.
Id. at f 48.
Plaintiffs incorrectly focus on a few isolated and unexplained
instances within the Houghton III opinion referring to a "proportionate"
share of attorney fees and argue those references require the State to
pay fees of 33% in every case. The Houghton HI court gives no
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explanation for its use of the word "proportionate" and simply refers
back to paragraph 18 of its McCoy opinion, for example:
In McCoy, we concluded t h a t the State was obligated to
pay a proportionate amount of the plaintiffs attorney fees because
the plaintiff complied with section 26-19-17 of the Medicaid lien
statute. Id. f 18.
Houghton III, 2005 UT 63 at f 39; see also f 49. But paragraph 18 of
the McCoy opinion does not mention a "proportionate" share of attorney
fees. In fact, nowhere within the entire McCoy opinion is
"proportionate" used to describe attorney fees. Like the governing
statute, McCoy uses "proportionate" only in association with costs.
McCoy, 2000 UT 39 at f 19. Given that, and the specific citation to the
earlier McCoy case, it appears t h a t the use of "proportionate" in the
Houghton III opinion was an oversight. And, more importantly, nothing
in Houghton III indicates the Court intended to overrule McCoy's
holding t h a t the State must pay a "reasonable" attorney fee.15
Thus, the calculation of the proper amount of attorney fees to be
paid by the State cannot be determined by a simple mathematical
formula. The trial court recognized t h a t "this is a case where

15

In any event, "proportionate" attorney fees are not provided by
in the statute, which must govern.
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calculating damages would involve numerous individual mini-trials t h a t
would defeat the desired efficiency of having a class-action case." R.
4239 {Decertification Order, p. 46). The trial court's

Decertification

Order was not the first time the Plaintiffs' flat 33% fee argument was
rejected, nor was it the first recognition t h a t each individual case would
require a fact-specific examination of the proper attorney fee amount.
In 2003, Judge Nehring noted t h a t the calculation of fees is "a fact
intensive enterprise" and "that may create problems for a class. If it
does, so be it." R. 1798 {Transcript 04/28/2003

Hearing pp. 86-87).

Although there may be common questions of law or fact among the
Plaintiffs, those common questions do not "predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members." U t a h R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Each potential claim will need to be determined on its own unique facts.
Cases in which individualized, fact-intensive determinations
predominate over common questions of law or fact are ill-suited for class
action status.
Federal courts examining class actions under identical language of
federal rule 23 have come to similar conclusions. This Court recognizes
the persuasiveness of federal authorities that are interpreting identical
rules of civil procedure, and the Court will "freely refer to authorities
-35-

which have interpreted the federal rule." Gold Standard,

Inc. v.

American Barrick Res. Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990); Plumb v.
State, 809 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1990) (construing Rule 23(e)); Tucker v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, f 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947.
For example, in O'Sullivan

v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., 319

F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 2003), where plaintiffs alleged violations of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Fifth Circuit reversed the class
certification because it found the class would degenerate into a series of
individual trials to prove damages on the claims. Focusing on the
predominance requirement, the circuit court said t h a t the potential for
multiple suits made class certification inappropriate:
The extent (but not the nature) of Countrywide's
participation in the transactions varies, making
individualized calculations of damages predominate.
Where the plaintiffs' damage claims "focus almost
entirely on facts and issues specific to individuals rather
t h a n the class as a whole" . . . , the potential exists t h a t the
class action may "degenerate in practice into multiple
lawsuits separately t r i e d / ' . . . In such cases, class
certification is inappropriate.
Id. at 744-45 (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, in Piggly Wiggly Clarksville,

Inc. v. Interstate

Brands

Corp., 215 F.R.D. 523 (E.D. Texas 2003), plaintiffs sought class
certification in a case involving alleged price fixing for bread products.
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Although the court found t h a t the Rule 23(a) requirements were met, it
denied class certification because the Rule 23(b) predominance
requirement was not met. The court found t h a t predominance was
destroyed by the necessarily individual damage calculations:
Predominance and manageability may be destroyed
solely by the complexity of determining damages when
that determination does not lend itself to a
mathematical calculation that can be applied to all the
class members . . . . The lack of a generalized formula
would result in countless mini-trials on the issue of
damages if liability is first established.
Id. at 531 (internal citations omitted).
Next, in Clopton v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 197 F.R.D. 502 (N.D.
Ala. 2000), the plaintiffs wanted to certify a class in a case alleging a
rental car company improperly charged customers for gasoline they did
not use. The trial court denied class certification because individual
calculations of damages would predominate over other issues common to
the class. The court concluded that each case would turn on individual
facts that determined the proper damage calculation and destroyed
predominance and precluded class action status:
Indeed, it appears t h a t Clopton's individual contractbased claims will likely boil down to a factual dispute
about how full the tank of his vehicle was when he
returned it and whether a particular Adamson
employee used an erroneous assumption as to the size
-37-

of the tank to calculate the refueling charge. Such
evidence of individualized conduct on the part of
employees of Budget and its licensees indicates that
the Court would have to conduct thousands of factintensive mini-trials to determine breach and
damages with respect to each member's contractbased claims.
Id. at 509 (footnote omitted).
Likewise, in Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 68
(4th Cir. 1977), tobacco growers wanted to bring a class action antitrust
suit. The trial court declined to allow a class action, and the Fourth
Circuit agreed. The circuit court noted that when a calculation of
damages would require separate mini-trials, the damage aspects of the
case predominate and "render the class action unmanageable as a class
action." Id.
Finally, this Court's reasoning in Call v. City of West Jordan, 727
P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), is particularly relevant. In Call, this Court
upheld denial of class certification in a case where the amount of each
potential class members' claims would have to be determined on an
individual basis. Noting the importance of judicial economy in class
actions, the Call court stated:
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Judicial economy would be little served because the
amount of the claim of each class member would still
need to be determined on an individual basis,
regardless of class action status.
Id. at 183-184.
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
t h a t because the determination of attorney fees is an individual and
fact-intensive inquiry, the class should be decertified. Individual
inquiries defeat Rule 23's purposes and goals to achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense and to promote uniformity of decisions in cases
with similarly situated plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Rule
23(b)(3),s predominance requirement, and the class was properly
decertified. This Court should affirm the Decertification

Order.

Furthermore, after the trial court ordered the State to give
Plaintiffs full access to all of the third-party liability cases, R. 2165,
Plaintiffs reached the inescapable conclusion t h a t attorney fees have
already been paid in the vast majority of cases. Plaintiffs concede that
the State "gave 'consent' to representation in the overwhelming number
of cases." R. 3470. Plaintiffs also acknowledged they were wrong in
their belief that "denials would be predominant," in fact, Plaintiffs
learned that "consent was virtually universal." R. 3484.
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Thus, faced with the inevitable realization t h a t the number of
claims and the amount of money involved is significantly less t h a n
Plaintiffs originally claimed, Plaintiffs now claim t h a t not only are they
entitled to attorney fees where none were paid, they are also entitled to
more attorney fees in the cases where the State and the recipient's
attorney agreed to a fee amount and t h a t amount was paid or the lien
discounted. Plaintiffs lack any support for this novel theory.
The trial court ruled that, in cases where the State and the
recipient's attorney agreed to the amount of fees, the Court would not
change the terms of those agreements. R. 4241. In addition, the trial
court recognized more serious problems with certifying a class of
Plaintiffs where the State consented and paid an attorney fee or
discounted its lien. "In every case where the State paid an attorney fee
or discounted its lien, there will be issues involving estoppel, waiver, or
accord. By accepting the State's attorney fee or discount, a question
necessarily arises whether the recipient waived or is estopped from
asserting a right to additional attorney fees." R. 4242

{Decertification

Order, p. 49). Estoppel, waiver, and accord are all fact-intensive
inquiries and will require examination of each individual case. See, e.g.,
State v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) (noting "variety of fact-40-

intensive circumstances" where estoppel can apply); IHC Health
Inc. v.D&

KMgmt.

Servs.,

Inc., 2003 UT 5, f 7, 73 P.3d 320 (waiver is

intensely fact dependent question); Neiderhauser

Builders & Dev. Corp.

v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Utah App. 1992) (questions of fact
about accord and satisfaction precluded summary judgment). Thus, the
individual questions of estoppel, waiver, and accord would predominate.
The trial court properly decertified the class of Plaintiffs whose fees the
State has already paid, even if the amount was less t h a n 33%.
The proper amount of attorney fees will require a series of minitrials. Individual plaintiffs will have to prove the McCoy claim
elements. At a minimum, they will have to prove t h a t they were
represented by an attorney, t h a t they requested consent from the State
to pursue the State's claim, and the amount of the attorney fees that the
State must pay. The State can then raise any defenses it may have,
such as the recipient's lack of cooperation or that the State satisfied its
lien through its own efforts. A few of the potential individual questions
that will be involved in the attorney fee calculation are: 1) when the
recipient asked for the State's consent; 2) how much investigation had
been done on the case before the request for consent; 3) the likelihood
the case would settle without trial; 4) whether liability or causation
-41-

were aggressively contested; 5) the complexity of the case; 6) whether
the case went to trial; 7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
recipient's attorney; and 8) the amount of the Medicaid lien. R. 4237
{Decertification Order, p. 44 n. 20); R. 2827-28 (Affidavit of Brent

Perry,

\ 8 ) . Under these circumstances, the common questions do not
predominate over the questions affecting only individual class members,
and Rule 23(b)(3) is not satisfied. Thus, the class was properly
decertified. The trial court was well within the bounds of its discretion
when it decertified the class, and Plaintiffs have not shown how the trial
court exceeded those bounds. This Court should affirm the trial court.

III. Plaintiffs' Two "Related Questions" Are Not Properly
Before the Court.
Plaintiffs raise two "Related Questions" t h a t are not properly before
the Court and should be ignored. Plaintiffs ask the Court to opine on the
appropriate class criteria and ask the Court to opine on the scope of
discovery. This Court did not grant permission for Plaintiffs to appeal
either issue, and the Court should decline to address them. See

Houghton

III, 2005 UT 63 at \ 16; State v. Lush, 2001 UT 102, \ 32, 37 P.3d 1103
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(refusing to address an issue t h a t was beyond the scope of review for
which permission for interlocutory appeal was granted).
In .itltliii in,

HiLsitln'ati'ui

il llir issues is not necessary. P irst, they

have already been address?

/ /• - •" /

elements of a McCoy attorney fees claim. Nothing further is needed.
Second, as to Plaintiffs' request that this Court order "full and
iinn^trieh'd u.

•• * :

files was not limito

f

lammis access to ail wi Hie thnd-party liability
' • -1 I!

i

produce one hundred third-party liability case files. R. 4337, R. 2047-50.
After Plaintiffs' motion, the trial court ordered the State to produce "all
t

c< irum November i, iyy 1 to present where the

Medicaid recipient v.

-

VIMV-.,.*.

••<

..,i;;\. :

satisfied its lien." R. 2165. In accordance with that order, Plaintiffs had
full access to all 2,785 third-party liability case files. During a three and
10, 2006, Plaintiffs'
inspection team, which ronsisl^il nl i |i In fivi» pc**i|»l<*, wa* IVev In inspi*cl,
copy or scan any files it wanted. Plaintiffs chose what files to copy and
chose to copy only 412 of them. Plaintiffs' access was limited by no one
b

..'MiMMvc.

Plaintiffs i •

.-..,.. „^.. .. ,

vu. that Uh! tiiiu court would not ai w
an aid

»!. n-i*

«»i HMT . • <•? .ivs.-, me

information Plaintiffs need to determine potential recipients who may
have a McCoy claim is available without contacting those people. See R.
2830-3356 (copies of electronic case files produced in discovery). And
Plaintiffs have not shown otherwise. Nor have Plaintiffs argued in the
'petition for interlocutory appeal or in their brief, how the trial court's
discovery orders were an abuse of discretion.16 "A trial court is allowed
broad discretion in granting or denying discovery; 'its determinations on
this subject will not be overturned on appeal unless the court has abused
its discretion.'" State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 219, 222 (Utah 1995) (quoting
State u. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah 1982)). In light of the trial
court's order requiring the State to provide full access to all of the thirdparty liability files and the fact that Plaintiffs have not shown that the
information Plaintiffs seek was unavailable to them, the trial court's
discovery rulings were not an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiffs' "Related Questions" are nothing more than an attempt to
have this Court rule on issues that are not before it, have already been
addressed, or are better left to the discretion of the trial court at this time.

16

Plaintiffs have now waived that claim. Brown v. Glover, 2000
UT 89, f 23, 16 P.3d 540 (failure to raise issue in opening brief waives
it); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 23, 128 P.3d 1179 (court will not address
inadequately briefed issues).
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Plaintiffs can always preserve the issues below and raise them, if
necessary, aiu L Jie case concludes.

CONCLUSION
This (

i' s — \

' < •(]

' •

' .

(•////

i ,,w/t//; ( / ' / C i

because Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory revi *• •-w wn s 1 • • 1

r

11111, 11 111

Court concludes that the petition was timely filed, the Court should hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it decertified the
class, I'l'i lie • 23(b)(3Xs i € q;i lirement that th 3 • z :xi w .: t-su > ... ;<^i and law
predominate over issues that affect only individii

'!.«— - >\ >%>.•

satisfied. The trial court properly decertified the class. This Court should
affirm the trial court.
}4i
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ADDENDUM A

the date of entry of such order, did not apply
retroactively to husband's appeal from the trial
court's entry of divorce decree and thus husband s notice of appeal filed before entry of
order amending the divorce judgment was a
nullity, pursuant to previous version, of rule;
Supreme Court's order adopting amendment estabhshed an effective date for the amendment,
and husband's time to file appeal from the
amended divorce judgment expired before such
effective date Dent v. Dent, 200S 1?7 V'\&

R U L E 5.

1292, J 4 2 Utah Ads RIJJ i 200S Ul App S<>8
Divorce @» 181
A l t h o u g h d e f a u l t judgment entered in d.vo^c
^
^
action ^
final
three months
, . ,
,
.
r
c
A
after its entry, such judgment started running of
three-month period within which to file motion
to set aside decree or one-month period within
which to take appeal. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rules 60(b), 73. Kessimakis v Kessimakis,
1976 546 P 2d 888. Divorce e=> 161

DISCRETIONARY APPEALS HtOM INTERLOCK I OKI OH11
DFRS

(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order
may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal from
the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction
over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, with
proof of service on all other parties to the action, A timely appeal from an
order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the
appellate court determines is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate
court, be considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission to
appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may direct the appellant to
file a petition that conforms to the requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule.
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to the Supreme
Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court an original
and five copies of the petition, together with the fee required by statute. For a
petition presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with the
Clerk of the eCourt of Appeals an original and four copies of the petition,
together with the fee required by statute. The petitioner shall serve the petition
on the opposing party and notice of the filing of t h e petition on the trial court.
If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate court
shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the respective parties and
shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together with a copy of the petition,
to the trial court where the petition and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of
appeal.
(c) Content of petition.
(c)(1) The petition shall contain:
(c)(1)(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration ol ihe issue
presented and the order sought to be reviewed;
(c)(1)(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and circumstances of th<
case but without unnecessary detail, and a demonstration that the issue wa
preserved in the trial court. Petitioner must state the applicable standard o
appellate review and cite supporting authority;
(c)(1)(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appe i
should be permitted, including a concise analysis of the statutes, i ules or case
believed to be determinative of the issue stated; and
443
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)(1)(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance
termination of the litigation.
)(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the
Lit of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the Court' of Appeals"
11 appear immediately under the title of the document, i.e. Petition for
mission to Appeal. Appellant may then set forth in the petition a concise
ement why the Supreme Court should decide the case in light of the
vant factors listed in Rule 9(c)(9).
)(3) The petitioner shall attach a copy of the order of the trial court from
ch an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact and conclusions of
and opinion.
1) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party may
an answer in opposition or concurrence. If the appeal is subject to
gnment by the Supreme Court to^the Court o£ Appeals, the answer may
tain a concise response to the petitioner's contentions under Rule 5(c). An
;inal and five copies of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An
;inal and four copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The respondent
[1 serve the answer on the petitioner. The petition and any answer shall be
tnitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered.
0 Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be
nted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may
erially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness of
order before final judgment will better serve the administration and
rests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particuissue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms,
uding the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court may
Tmine. The clerk of the appellate court shall immediately give the parties
trial court notice by mail of any order granting or denying the petition. If
petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have been filed and
keted by the granting of the petition. All proceedings subsequejit to the
iting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for appeals
n final judgments except that no docketing statement shall be filed under
e 9 unless the court otherwise orders.
) Stays pending interlocutory review. The appellate court will not consider
ipphcation for a stay pending disposition of an interlocutory appeal until the
tioner has filed a petition for interlocutory appeal.
e n d e d effective O c t o b e r 1, 1992; J u l y 1, 1 9 9 4 ; April 1, 1 9 9 6 , N o v e m b e r 1, 1 9 9 9 ;
1 1, 2 0 0 4 , N o v e m b e r 1, 2 0 0 6 ]
Cross R e f e r e n c e s
locutory appeal, petition, see Rules App Proc , Form 2
Library R e f e r e n c e s
peal and Error <3»361, 366
lminal Law <£=> 1071, 1072

Westlaw Key N u m b e r Searches
30k366, 110kl071, 110kl072

30k361;

APPEALS FROM TRIAL CCU
C J , S Appeal and E r r o r § § 8 6 , 1'
-312,316,318
C J . S Criminal Law § 1685.
Unil
Interlocutory appeal,
Civil rights actions in state coi
of qualified immunity, right,

In general 1
Adoption proceedings 12
pail and bail forfeiture 10
Bindover orders 11
Child custody proceedings 20
Cpllateral orders \1
jDependency and neglect proceeding
Discovery rulings- 16
Discretion of court 4
Habeas corpus 13
Insurance receivership and hquiaatj
Motions to dismiss 8
Necessity of petition 5
Notice of appeal 5.5 " , j,
Partial summary judgment 19
Pleas and plea agreements 9
Post trial motions 21
Purpose of rule 2
Removal orders 18
A
Rulings affecting substantial rignfcT
Separate claims 6
Trial court 3
1.

In general
Orders and judgments that are
be appealed if such appeals are si
missible, if the appellate court g *
sion, or if the trial court expressly
as final for purposes of appeal
P r o c , Rule 5, Rules Civ Proc.
Bradbury v Valencia, 2000, 5 I
Utah'Adv Rep 7, 2000 UT 50
Error <S=» 68, Appeal And Error <S=
As exceptions to the "final judf
party may appeal an mterlocuU*
governing statute so provides; it
properly certifies the order undei
erning certification for appeal or
Appeals grants permission for ai
appeal under rule governing app*
locutory orders
Rules Civ.Pro<
Rules App Proc , Rule 5 Matter^
Paby K , 1998, 967 P.2d 9 4 7 , ^
Rep 37. Appeal And Error &* 3«
Appeal of right taken from ui
der will be treated as permissrv
appeal only in extraordinary cas
£ r o c , Rule 5 Town of Manil
Land C o , 1991, 818 P-2d 2 Ap
@=>358
#
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court Fed Rules Civ Proc rule 54(d) 28
U S C A , U C A 1953, 22-3 12(2) Bnsacher v
Tracy-Collins Trust Company, 1960, 277 F 2d
519 Interpleader <§=» 35
In interpleader action wherein bank which
held escrow documents sought determination
pf rights of purchaser and vendors under install
ment real estate contract, awarding bank attorney fee of $1,500 was proper, in view of fact
that a rule authorized bank to file the inter
pleader action and that escrow agreement gave
a
_ Relief awarded, proceedings and relief
bank option to await judicial determination beInjunctive relief in an interpleader action is
fore continuing its duties under the agreement
especially-proper where there are n u m e r o u s
and granted bank a hen for all actual and necesclaimants and where such relief would present
sary expenses and liabilities incurred
Rules
a multiplicity of lawsuits 28 U S C A § 1335
Civ Proc , Rule 22 First Sec Bank of Utah,
US v Major Oil C o r p , 1978, 583 F 2d 1152
N A v Maxwell, 1983, 659 P 2d 1078 InterInterpleader ®=> 32
pleader <3=> 35
An injunctive power of a court hearing in
In interpleader action wherein bank, which
interpleader action is nationwide and is intendheld escrow documents, sought determination
ed to hold any proceeding the court deems
of rights of purchaser and vendors under installinconsistent with the interpleader proceeding
ment real estate contract, award of $1,500 in
28 U S C A § 2361 U S v Major Oil Corp
attorney fees to bank was to be paid by vendors,
1978, 583 ¥2d 1152 Interpleader <&=> 32
in view of fact that they breached their covenants under escrow agreement by instructing
10.
Judgment or decree, proceedings a n d
bank not to accept further payments from pu£n
relief
>r
chaser when the instructions read clearly to the
Where trial court in interpleader action made
contrary, and purchaser, who was delinquent
no adjudication on claims as between former until certain date, was to bear whatever attorpartners i n used car business to Juno's withney fees were found to be reasonably owing the
drawn from partnership checking account a n 4 ? * vendors for enforcing contract until that date
proceeds of sale of car by second! partner, b u t , First Sec Bank of Utah, JJ A v Maxwell, 1983,
rather, merely recognized that controversy con659 P 2d 1078 Interpleader <£=> 35
cerning such !money was pending for resolution
Award of costs and attorney fees to party who
in first partner's, suit for assets and an accountproperly brings an interpleader action is within
ing, and orderecf that fund be held in partnerequitable discretion of trial court Capson v
ship account inf bank urltil such suit was reBnsbois, 1979, 592 P 2d 583 Interpleader <&=>
solved, judgment in interpleader action had no
35
res judicata effect upon such stut fr Rules of
Where it appears that party bringing mterCivil Procedure, Rule 22 Terry's Stales, trie v.
Vander Veur,*1980, 618 P 2 d 29 'Judgment•$=> I pleader action has, through his own fault,
caused the conflicting claims necessitating in650
„ ^
terpleader, it is proper to deny party s motion
Where a litigant tenders the money claimed
by^two other parties into court, no judgment in * for attorney fees Capson v Bnsbois, 1979, 592
his favor for the money can legally be entere^£ f 2d 583 Interpleader <®==> 35
Where purchasers, who entered into agreeMcGuire v State Bank of Tremonton, 1917, 49
ment with vendors to buy parcel of land which
Utah 381, 164 P 494. interpleader <S» 33 i ^ , , i
"deal subsequently fell through and who were
11.
Costs and fees, proceedings and rerequired to make $1,000 earnest money depdsit
lief
with realty company, failed to appear at trial,
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denyAttorney's fees incurred by trustee and benefiing realty company which brought interpleader
ciaries in trustee s interpleader action were of a
action, its costs and attorney fees Capson v
class historically beyond sCope of taxable costs
and their award necessarily postulated a per
Bnsbois 1979 592 P 2d 583 Interpleader <£=»
mitting statute or an equitable discretion in trial
35

In action against bank for savings payable to
tjand or wife or survivor wherein wife's exltnx claimed wife's share, deceased wife's
lece's testimony regarding conversation between husband and wife wherem wife told husband wife would leave large part of her money
niece held not inadmissible as irrelevant and
mmatenal Obradovich v Walker Bros Bankers, 1932, 80 Utah 587, 16 P 2d 212
Interpleader <®=* 29 ,
^
,

TfTTT E 23, CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
?IS
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6f law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of Conduct for*
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
* would as a practical matter be dispositive 'of the interests' ctf the other
^ ^ e m b e r s not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
^t&eir .ability to protect their interests; or
tC

p9\Tfre party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
rfeliefpr corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
'V

or
(5) The courjt finds that* the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual inembers,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any,
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against mem^
bers of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the*
litigation of the .claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be maintained^
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or,
amended before the decision on the merits.
M
(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court shall;
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under th||
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identi^
fied through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A|;
the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date>J
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who dcg
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusioffl
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
216
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(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a< class action under Subdivisioi
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether, Qr not favorable to the class, shall include a n d describ
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in a]
action maintained as a class action under Subdivision (b)(3), whether or nc
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom th
notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requeste
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a cla*
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided inl
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this ru
shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which th
rule applies, the court may rnake appropriate orders: (1) determining tl
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition <
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for tl
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of tl
action, that notice be given in such m a n n e r as the court may direct to some <
all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of t]
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether Tthey consid
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims 1
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on t
representative parties or on intervenors; (,4) requiring that the pleadings
amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of abse
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with simil
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Ri
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to tin
(e) Dismissal o r Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice, of the^pr0pos
dismissal or, compromise shall be given to all members of the class' in^'Su
manner a s the court directs.
Cross References
Thrifts settlement financing, see § 7-21-1 et seq

Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a
Defendant Class A Proposed Revision of Rule
23, 1990 BYU L Rev 909(1990)
Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and
Superior to None Class Certification of Particu-

lar Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 Utal
Rev 249 (2002)

Library References
Compromise and Settlement <S=*53 to 71
Declaratory Judgment <S=>305
Parties <S=*35 1 to 35 21, 35 31 to 35 51, 35 61
to 35 89
Westlaw Key Number Searches 287k35 l t o
287k35.2l,
287k353l to 287k355l,
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287k35 61 to 287k35 89, 89k53 to 89
118Ak305
C J S Compromise and Settlement §§ 2
27
~To ™
„
CC » f l i 1( , , n
C J S Parties §§ 28 to 38, 40, 55

ADDENDUM B

M£I>ICAL

§26-19-7

BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT

Note 3

n)(a) If ^ e r e c i p i e n t proceeds without the department's written consent as
ired by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision,
wl ment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the
action.
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to
which the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has
orovided and retains its right to commence an independent action against the
third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what terms
the interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced by
the recipient.
(4) The department may not pay more than 3 3 % of its total recovery for
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action that
is commenced with the department's written consent.
Uws 1984, c. 34, § 5; Laws 1989, c. 163, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 102, § 3, eff. May 1, 1995.
Cross References
Costs awarded upon judgment, see Rules Civ. P r o a , Rule 54.
Intervention, see Rules Civ. P r o a , Rule 24.

Notes of Decisions
In general 1
Construction with federal law 2
Costs and attorney fees 5
Proceeds payable by third party 4
Recovery without consent of state 3
1. In general
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, State
may (1) take action directly against the third
party for reimbursement of medical assistance
benefits, for which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to recipients of medical assistance seeking to pursue the State's
claim, whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney fees and, if any,
its proportionate share of the costs of an action;
or (3) refuse consent and proceed against the
recipient after the recipient recovers from the
third party, in which case the State's recovery
shall be reduced by reasonable attorney fees.
U.CA1953, 26-19-7(l)(a), (4). State ex rel.
Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000, 999
P2d 572, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 39
H e a l t h s 496(1)
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, when
the State elects to recover directly from a medical assistance recipient who has expressly excluded the State's claim from any attempt to
recover from a third party, the State must pay
the attorney fees incurred in procuring the
State's share of the settlement proceeds. U.C.A
1953, 26-19-7(l)(a), (4) State ex rel. Office of

Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000, 999 P.2d
572, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 39.
Health <3=* 497
1989 amendment to Medical Benefits Recovery Act, which previously prohibited filing of
claim without State consent and, as amended,
included settlement, compromise, release, or
waiver of claim as well, was not substantive,
and thus, could be applied retroactively. U.C.A.
1953, 26-19-7(l)(a). Matter of Estate of Higley, 1991, 810 P.2d 436. Health <3=> 456
2.

Construction with federal law
Federal statute stating that no lien may be
imposed against individual prior to death on
account of having received state medical assistance did not apply to third-party insurance
settlement payments received by state Medicaid
recipient, as third-party payments did not legally become property of Medicaid recipient until
after valid settlement, which necessarily included reimbursement to state for Medicaid benefits. Social Security Act, § 1917(a), as amended, 42 U S.C.A
§ 1396p(a),
U C A 1953,
26-19-5, 26-19-7(l)(a), (2). S S v State, 1998,
972 P.2d 439, 357 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 Health
<3»497
3.

Recovery without consent of state
State was entitled to recover from recipients
medical assistance payments advanced m his
behalf, as recipient settled his claim with insurer without state's consent
U C A. 1953,

223

§26-19-5

HEALTH CODE

Note 8
recover from a third party, the State must pay
the attorney fees incurred in procuring the
State's share of the settlement proceeds. U.C.A.
1953, 26M9-7(l)(a), (4). State ex rel. Office of

§ 26—19—6.

Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000, 999 P.2d
572, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 39.
Health <3=} 497

Action by department—Notice to recipient

(l)(a) Within 30 days after commencing an action under Subsection
26-19-5(3), the department shall give the recipient, his guardian, personal
representative, trustee, estate, or survivor, whichever is appropriate, written
notice of the action by:
(i) personal service or certified mail to the last known address of the
person receiving the notice; or
(ii) if no last-known address is available, by publishing a notice once a
week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the county where the recipient resides.
(b) Proof of service shall be filed in the action.
(c) The recipient may intervene in the department's action at any time
before trial.
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the court in which the
action is commenced and advise the recipient of:
(a) the right to intervene in the proceeding;
(b) the right to obtain a private attorney; and
(c) the department's right to recover medical assistance directly from the
third party.
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 18; Laws 1984, c. 34, § 4; Laws 1985, c. 21, § 10; Laws 2004,
72, § 3, eff. May 3, 2004.
Cross References
Intervention, see Rules Civ. P r o c , Rule 24.
Library R e f e r e n c e s
Health <3=>502.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 198Hk502.

§ 2 6 — 1 9 - 7 . Action or claim by recipient—Consent of department required—Department's right to intervene—Department's interests protected—Attorney's fees and costs
(l)(a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle,
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department has
provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance, without the
department's written consent.
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action
commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the
same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has becomeobligated to provide medical assistance.
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General
State ex rel. Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy
Utah,2000.
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, By and Through the OFFICE OF
RECOVERY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
John L. McCOY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 970340.
April 14, 2000.
State brought suit under Medical Benefits Recovery
Act to recover medical assistance provided recipient
from attorney who had settled recipient's personal
injury suit. The Third District Court, Salt Lake,
Dennis M. Fuchs, J., entered summary judgment in
favor of State requiring attorney to reimburse State
for medical assistance. Attorney appealed. The
Supreme Court, Russon, Associate C.J., held that:
(1) federal anti-lien statute did not preclude State's
recovery; (2) State was entitled to recover medical
assistance payments from settlement, even though
State had denied attorney permission to pursue
medical assistance claim on its behalf and attorney
had specifically excluded State's claim from his
settlement negotiations with third party on behalf of
recipient; and (3) State's recovery should have been
reduced by attorney's reasonable attorney fees for
procuring state's share of proceeds.

30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(2) k. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Most Cited Cases
Appeal and Error 30 €==>863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness and accord no deference to
the trial court's legal conclusions. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 56.
[2] Statutes 361 €=^181(1)
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl80 Intention of Legislature
361kl81 In General
361kl81(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €==>188

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Durham, J., filed concurring opinion.
Wilkins, J., filed opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Howe, C.J., joined.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €^>842(2)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When interpreting a legislative enactment, court's
primary role is to give effect to the legislature's
intent as set forth in the statute's plain language.
[3] Health 198H €^>457
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198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(A) In General
198Hk457 k. Preemption. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241)

settlement were assigned by operation of law to
State to extent of medical assistance benefits
provided to recipient, even though recipient
expressly excluded the State's claim from any
attempt to recover from third party. U.C.A.1953,
26-19-4.5.

Health 198H € ^ 4 9 2

[5] Health 198H €==>497

198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk492 k. Liens in General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241)

198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIH(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk497
k.
Settlements
or
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241)
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, State
possessed lien against entire proceeds of personal
injury settlement obtained by medical assistance
recipient, including both amount designated medical
payment and amount designated as bodily injury
payment. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-4.5.

States 360 €==>18.79
360 States
3601 Political Status and Relations
3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption
360kl8.79 k. Social Security and Public
Welfare. Most Cited Cases
State's claim for reimbursement of medical
assistance from personal injury settlement was not
preempted by federal anti-lien statute, which
precludes imposition of lien for medical assistance
against property of any individual prior to his death,
as recovery did not become recipient's property
until State was reimbursed. Social Security Act, §
1917(a)(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(l)
;U.CA. 1953, 26-19-4.5.
[4] Health 198H € ^ 4 9 7
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk497
k.
Settlements
or
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241)
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, proceeds of
medical assistance recipient's personal injury
© 2007 Thomson/West. No
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[6] Health 198H €=>497
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk497
k.
Settlements
or
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241)
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, State was
entitled to recover full extent of medical assistance
payments
from
personal
injury
settlement
negotiated by private attorney on behalf of
recipient, even though State had denied attorney
permission to pursue medical assistance claim on its
behalf, attorney had specifically excluded State's
claim from his settlement negotiations with third
party on behalf of recipient, and only small portion
of settlement had been designated as being for
medical expenses. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-4.5.
[7] Health 198H €=^496(1)
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198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk496 Third Persons, Recovery
from
198Hk496(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241)
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, recipient of
medical assistance who has recovered for personal
injuries against third party cannot recover portion of
costs incurred from State, even if the recipient
obtained consent to seek a recovery of medical
assistance on the State's behalf, so long as recipient
settled without "commenc[ing] an action" on State's
behalf. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(4).
[8] Health 198H €==>497
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in' General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk497
k.
Settlements
or
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241)
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, when the
State elects to recover directly from a medical
assistance recipient who has expressly excluded the
State's claim from any attempt to recover from a
third party, the State must pay the attorney fees
incurred in procuring the State's share of the
settlement proceeds. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a), (4)
[9] Health 198H €^496(1)
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk496 Third Persons, Recovery
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

from
198Hk496(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241)
Under Medical Benefits Recovery Act, State may
(1) take action directly against the third party for
reimbursement of medical assistance benefits, for
which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant
consent to recipients of medical assistance seeking
to pursue the State's claim, whereby the State's
recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney
fees and, if any, its proportionate share of the costs
of an action; or (3) refuse consent and proceed
against the recipient after the recipient recovers
from the third party, in which case the State's
recovery shall be reduced by reasonable attorney
fees. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a), (4).

*573 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Stephanie M.
Saperstein, Karma Dixon, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff.
John L. McCoy, pro se.
RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice:
% 1 Defendant John L. McCoy appeals from the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the State requiring McCoy to reimburse the State
for medical assistance received by McCoy's client,
David Sevey.

K 2 On July 10, 1993, David Sevey was injured
when he slipped and fell on a sidewalk in front of a
K-Mart store. The property was owned by G.
Walter Gasser & Associates ("Gasser").™1
Lacking adequate funds to pay his medical bills,
which exceeded $16,000, Sevey requested medical
assistance from the State of Utah. The State paid
$8,846.92 toward Sevey's medical bills.

FN1. The record names the property owner
alternately as Gasser and CDI. For
purposes of this opinion, we refer to
Gasser as the owner.
K 3 Thereafter, Sevey retained an attorney, John L.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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McCoy, to seek recovery of damages from Gasser.
Before proceeding against any potentially liable
parties, McCoy contacted the Office of Recovery
Services ("ORS") requesting consent to bring an
action on the State's behalf against Gasser's insurer.
On *574 July 19, 1994, ORS wrote a letter to
McCoy declining McCoy's request to represent
ORS and stating that ORS would seek full recovery
directly from any liable third parties. Additionally,
ORS requested that McCoy "discuss particulars of
this case with [ORS] prior to any settlement
negotiations." McCoy wrote a letter responding to
ORS, explaining, "Your letter of July 19, 1994
leaves me no other choice but not to include your
claim for medical expenses in any action that I take.
" On July 21, 1994, ORS sent notices to Sevey,
McCoy, and K-Mart explaining that the State has a
lien against any money payable to Sevey up to
$8,846.92
K 4 On July 20, 1995, McCoy sent a demand letter
to Gasser's insurer, Great American Insurance
Company ("Great American"),™2 demanding
payment on behalf of Sevey. Specifically, McCoy
requested to settle with Great American "for the
sum of $35,000.00, plus medical bills of $8,000.00."
Explaining his demand for medical costs, McCoy
noted in his letter to Great American:

FN2. The record names the insurer
alternately as Great American Insurance
Company and American National Fire
insurance Company. For purposes of this
opinion, we refer to the insurer as "Great
American."
[Sevey's] medical bills from the tibia and fibula
fracture are $7,297.66, copies of which are
attached. These do not include the first bills for the
removal of the patella which amounted to roughly
$8,000.00, which the State of Utah paid. The State
of Utah will not allow me to pursue their claim,
therefore, I do not make any demand for any
medical bills that the State has paid or will pay.
McCoy added that Sevey's total medical bills "even
excluding the medical bills that the State has
advanced are $8,000.00."

© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No
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f 5 McCoy eventually settled Sevey's dispute with
Great American, and on October 9, 1995, Great
American issued two checks to McCoy, both listing
McCoy and Sevey as co-payees. One check for
$22,800 was labeled as payment for "BODILY
INJURY"; the other check for $5,000 was labeled
as "MEDICAL PAYMENT." Upon receipt of the
settlement proceeds, McCoy placed $8,846.92 in
his client trust account. On October 13, 1995,
Sevey signed a document releasing both K-Mart
and Gasser from "any and all claims" resulting from
the slip-and-fall incident.
T[ 6 Shortly thereafter, the State commenced this
action against McCoy pursuant to the Utah Medical
Benefits Recovery Act (the "Act"), alleging that the
State was entitled to recover $8,846.92 from the
settlement proceeds. The State moved for
summary judgment on its claim, arguing that the
Act required McCoy to reimburse the State in full.
H 7 In response, McCoy contended first that the
State's claim under the Act was preempted by a
federal anti-lien statute. Second, McCoy claimed
that the State was not entitled to reimbursement
from the settlement proceeds because he
specifically excluded the $8,846.92 from his
settlement negotiations. Third, in the alternative,
McCoy contended that if the State was entitled to
reimbursement from the settlement proceeds, the
State's recovery was limited to the $5,000
designated as medical payment. Fourth, McCoy
argued that in the event he must reimburse the State,
he is entitled to attorney fees for procuring the
settlement.
H 8 The trial court granted the State's motion for
summary judgment, ordering McCoy to pay the full
amount of $8,846.92 to the State with no reduction
for attorney fees. McCoy now appeals.

[1][2] U 9 Summary judgment is proper when there
are no issues of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SeeUtah
R. Civ. P. 56(e); Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, U
12, 979 P.2d 322. We review a trial court's grant
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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or denial of summary judgment for correctness and
accord no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. See Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000
UT 30, 1f 12, 996 P.2d 1043. We also note that
when interpreting a legislative enactment, our
primary role is to give effect to the legislature's
intent as set forth in the *575 statute's plain
language. See Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184
(Utah 1998).

I. PREEMPTION UNDER THE FEDERAL
ANTI-LIEN STATUTE
[3] f 10 McCoy's first argument is that the State's
claim for reimbursement under the Act is preempted
by the federal anti-lien statute, which reads:
No lien may be imposed against the property of any
individual prior to his death on account of medical
assistance paid... on his behalf under the State plan.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(l) (Supp.1999). This
issue was resolved by two cases decided after this
appeal was filed, S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah
1998), and Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d
446 (Utah 1998). S.S. and Wallace held that under
the Act, any third-party recovery does not become
the "property" of the recipient until the recipient has
reimbursed the State for all medical assistance the
State provided. See S.S., 972 P.2d at 442; Wallace,
972 P.2d at 448. As a result, the State's attempt to
recover from the settlement proceeds does not
amount to a lien upon the recipient's "property."
See S.S., 972 P.2d at 442; Wallace, 972 P.2d at 448
. Therefore, the Act does not conflict with the
federal statute.

II. THE STATE'S RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT
\ 11 McCoy next argues that the State is not
entitled to any reimbursement from the settlement
proceeds because McCoy specifically excluded the
State's claim for $8,846.92 from his settlement
negotiations. Alternatively, McCoy contends that,
if the State is entitled to reimbursement from the
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

proceeds, the State's recovery is limited to the
$5,000 specifically designated as medical payment.
[4][5] [6] \ 12 Three provisions of the Act are
determinative of McCoy's arguments. First, the
Act provides:
(1) (a) To the extent that medical assistance is
actually provided to a recipient, all benefits for
medical services or payments from a third party
otherwise payable to or on behalf of a recipient are
assigned by operation of law to the department if
the department provides, or becomes obligated to
provide, medical assistance, regardless of who
made application for the benefits on behalf of the
recipient.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-4.5(l)(a) (1998)
(emphasis added). 1 ^ 3 Second, the Act provides in
pertinent part:
FN3. The "department" to which the Act
refers is the Department of Health, which
was created pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
26-1-4 (Supp.1981).
(b) The department's claim to recover medical
assistance provided as a result of the injury ... is a
lien against any proceeds payable to or on behalf of
the recipient by that third party.
Id. § 26-19-5(1 Kb) (emphasis added). Third, the
Act states:
(b) The department may recover in full from the
recipient or any party to which the proceeds were
made payable all medical assistance which it has
provided and retains its right to commence an
independent action against the third party....
Id.§ 26-19-7(2)(b) (emphasis added). Thus, under
section 26-19-4.5, the settlement proceeds are
assigned by operation of law to the State to the
extent that the State has provided benefits to Sevey,
i.e., $8,846.92. Additionally, under section
26-19-5, the State possesses a lien against the entire
settlement proceeds, including both the amount
designated as medical payment and the amount
designated as bodily injury payment. Finally,
under section 26-19-7, the State is entitled to
recover in full from the settlement proceeds all of
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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the medical assistance the State provided to Sevey.
Therefore, under these provisions of the Act, the
State is entitled to recover $8,846.92 from the
settlement proceeds.

III. MCCOY'S ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEY
FEES
K 13 Finally, McCoy argues that if the State is
entitled to recover from the settlement*576
proceeds, he is entitled to recover attorney fees
from the State for procuring the settlement. The
State contends that McCoy is not entitled to
attorney fees under the Act because he lacked
consent to bring an action on the State's behalf.
Tf 14 Before determining whether the Act requires
the State to pay attorney fees, we must examine the
provision of the Act that requires consent to bring a
claim on the State's behalf. This provision states:
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence
an action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a
claim against a third party for recovery of medical
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which
the department has provided or has become
obligated to provide medical assistance, without the
department's written consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(a) (1998). Thus,
under this statute, a recipient must seek the State's
consent before attempting to recover from a third
party for any medical costs paid by the State. We
explained in S. S. v. State that "[t]his provision
protects both the liable third party and the State
from ill-informed or devious action by the recipient.
" 972 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1998).
T[ 15 In the instant case, it is undisputed that
McCoy lacked the State's consent to pursue the
State's claim against Great American. McCoy
requested, and the State denied, consent to pursue
the State's claim. McCoy then provided notice to
the State and the third party that he was not seeking
to recover for those medical costs for which the
State had provided assistance to Sevey. Rather,
McCoy expressly excluded the State's claim for
reimbursement from his settlement negotiations.
Thus, in accordance with the Act, McCoy did not
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No

settle any claim for medical costs for which the
State provided assistance. The State nonetheless
argues that because McCoy lacked consent to bring
an action on the State's behalf, the State-although
demanding payment from the recipient's settlement
proceeds-does not have to pay a share of McCoy's
attorney fees in securing that settlement.
[7] T| 16 We now turn to the provision of the Act
governing awards of attorney fees and costs. This
provision reads:
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of
its total recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a
proportionate share of the costs in an action that is
commenced with the department's written consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). Subsection
(4) of section 26-19-7 is divided by a comma into
two separate parts, the former dealing with attorney
fees and the latter dealing with costs. We look first
to the portion that addresses awards of costs. The
plain language of this portion of subsection (4) is
narrowed to award only the costs of "an 'action.:.
commenced with the department's written consent."
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, a recipient cannot
recover "costs" where an action has not commenced
even though the recipient has "file[d] a claim" or "
settle[d], compromise[d], releasefd], or waive[d] a
claim against a third party." Id. § 26-19-7(l)(a).
This is true even if the recipient obtained consent to
seek a recovery on the State's behalf.
K 17 In the instant case, McCoy cannot recover
costs from the State because no "action" was
commenced against a third party; rather, McCoy "
settle[d]" and "compromise[d]" with the third party,
and Sevey "release[d]" the third party from any
further claims by Sevey. Id. As a result, even if
McCoy had obtained consent to bring the State's
claim, the State would have no duty to reimburse
him for costs, so long as he settled without "
commenc[ing] an action" on the State's behalf. Id.
[8] % 18 However, unlike the statute's limited
provision for costs, the portion of subsection (4)
that provides for attorney fees is not restricted to
reimbursement for fees incurred in an "action"; nor
is it limited to those cases in which the State grants
its consent. Rather, the plain language of the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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attorney fees provision simply states that "[t]he
department may not pay more than 33% of its total
recovery for attorney's fees." Id. § 26-19-7(4).
Thus, in contrast to what the State suggests, the
attorney fees portion of subsection (4) in no way
limits the award of fees to recipients who obtained
consent to pursue the State's claim. Moreover, the
*577 State provides no statutory, case law, or policy
ba^is for limiting awards of attorney fees to those
recipients to whom the State, at its discretion, grants
consent. We see no justification for so limiting the
relatively broad reach of subsection (4) in the case
before us. In fact, it would be inherently unfair not
to award attorney fees to McCoy, who has followed
the requirements of the Act in securing a recovery
on behalf of his client.1^4 We therefore conclude
that under subsection (4), when the State elects to
recover directly from a recipient who has expressly
excluded the State's claim from any attempt to
recover from a third party, the State must pay the
attorney fees incurred in procuring the State's share
of the settlement proceeds.™5

In the instant case, McCoy failed to keep
the State minimally informed, but McCoy's
lack of forthrightness did not prejudice the
State's claim against the third party. Even
though the State was unable to provide
notice to the proper third party before the
settlement, notice from the State is not
necessary under the Act when "the third
party had knowledge that the department
provided or was obligated to provide
medical assistance." Id. § 26-19-5(3)(b).
McCoy informed the third party that the
State had provided medical assistance to
Sevey and that the State intended to
enforce its lien directly against the third
party. Thus, McCoy effectively preserved
the State's right of action under the Act
against the third party. We therefore need
not address the question today of whether
the legislature intended not to award
attorney fees to a recipient whose "failure
to cooperate" prevents the State from
recovering from a third party.

FN4. The State suggested at oral argument
that McCoy should not be entitled to
attorney fees because he failed to inform
the State that Great American was the
insurer with whom he was settling Sevey's
claim. We emphasize that a recipient has
a duty to cooperate with the State in
identifying and providing information to
assist the State in pursuing any third party
who may be liable to pay for medical care
and services. See42 C.F.R. § 433.147
(1999); Utah Admin. Code R527-800-8,
R527-936-2 (1997). Keeping the State
informed ensures that the State will not be
prejudiced in its efforts to recover medical
benefits. For example, withholding the
identity of the third party from the State
may jeopardize the State's ability to
preserve its claim against the third party.
In order to bring a claim for
reimbursement against a third party, the
Act requires the State to provide notice of
its lien to the third party before the third
party settles with the recipient. SeeUtah
Code Ann. § 26-19-5(3)(a) (1998).

FN5, Having elected not to recover
directly from the third party in the case
before us, the State not only incurred a
responsibility to pay attorney fees, but also
effectively reduced Sevey's net recovery.
As a result, neither the State nor Sevey will
recover the $8,846.92 that Sevey excluded
from his claim against the third party.
This is because the State's lien under the
Act is limited to the $8,846.92 of medical
expenses that the State provided, and by
enforcing its lien against McCoy, the State
can no longer pursue its claim against the
third party. Likewise, Sevey cannot seek
the additional $8,846.92 because Sevey
released the third party as a condition of
settlement.
[9] K 19 In sum, while the Act provides discretion
to the State when selecting a suitable avenue for
recovering medical assistance, each method of
recovery requires the State to pay its share of
attorney fees. The State may (1) take action
directly against the third party, for which the State
pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to
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recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim,
whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by
reasonable attorney fees and, if any, its
proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3)
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient
after the recipient recovers from the third party, in
which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by
reasonable attorney fees.

f 20 We affirm the judgment of the trial court to
the extent it held that the State is entitled to recover
$8,846.92 from McCoy, but reverse to the extent
the court failed to reduce the State's recovery by
McCoy's reasonable attorney fees for procuring the
State's share of the settlement proceeds. We
therefore remand for a determination of attorney
fees to be awarded McCoy and other appropriate
action consistent with this opinion.
% 21 Justice DURRANT concurs in Associate
Chief Justice RUSSON's
opinion.DURHAM,
Justice, concurring:
U 22 As the majority opinion notes in footnote 6,
the State's actions in this case, although permitted
by the statute, have in my view unfairly penalized
the injured person. The injured person's net
recovery has been *578 reduced by over $8,000
because the State neither consented to allow the
injured person to seek recovery for the State's claim
against the third-party tortfeasor, nor itself sought
such recovery. I hope that the legislature will
reexamine this portion of the statute, which refills
the state coffers out of money belonging to injured
parties rather than the funds of the third-party
tortfeasor liable for the injuries. The State is, of
course, entitled to reimbursement, but it ought to
have to "fish or cut bait" in the process of obtaining
that reimbursement from third parties.
WILKINS, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in
part:
If 23 I respectfully dissent with respect to part III.
I fully concur with the remainder of the majority
opinion.
^1 24"In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if
authorized by statute or by contract." Dixie State

Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).
In this case, there is neither a contract nor a statute
by which McCoy is entitled to fees from the State.
K 25 There is no question that McCoy did not enter
into a contractual arrangement with the Office of
Recovery Services. He offered to do so, and to file
a claim on behalf of the State for reimbursement for
sums expended by the State. The State declined his
offer. McCoy then filed his action seeking to
recover for the injured Mr. Sevey an amount over
and above that potentially due the State.
^ 26 McCoy failed to alert the State when he
discovered that he had previously misinformed the
State of the proper insurance company. This
failure significantly diminished the State's ability to
alert the third party of the State's claim, or to
participate in any settlement negotiations. McCoy
rendered no service to the State that would have
assisted the State in recovering its portion of the
reimbursement directly from the third party. As
authorized by statute,1^1 the State sought its
recovery from the proceeds received by Mr. Sevey.
The State has a statutory lien on this amount, F N 2
and any recovery accrues first to the State to
replenish the public coffers prior to compensating
either Mr. Sevey or his attorney.

FN1. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)
(1998).
FN2. See id.§ 26-19-5(1).
If 27 The majority relies upon the language of
subsection (4) of section 26-19-7 in finding an
obligation on the part of the State to pay McCoy an
attorney fee from the recovered amount.
Subsection (4) reads:
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of
its total recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a
proportionate share of the costs in an action that is
commenced with the department's written consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). I find
nothing in this statutory language that requires any
payment to McCoy when the department declined to
give written consent. I read this language simply as
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a limitation on the maximum fees that may be paid
when written consent has been given, without a
limitation on the State paying its proportionate
share of costs for the same action.
U 28 I disagree with my colleagues that the
statutory language above quoted "in no way limits
the award of fees to recipients who obtained
consent to pursue the State's claim." I think it does
just that: When an action is commenced with the
State's consent, any payment for attorney fees by the
State is limited to a maximum of 33% of its total
recovery. Moreover, that is all the statute does. It
simply does not address any obligation or lack of
obligation to pay attorney fees when the State's
consent is not given.
K 29 I find no other statutory basis, nor do my
colleagues identify one, that authorizes the State to
pay McCoy his claimed fee from the public coffers.
Absent a statute, or contract, providing such an
authorization, I would hold that McCoy is not
entitled to his fees in this case.
U 30 The legislature has granted the Office of
Recovery Services the discretion to consent or not
to consent to the representation of a particular
attorney. Even if this is "inherently unfair" as my
colleagues suggest, it is simply the law: The policy
choice has been made by the legislature in this
instance, *579 and challenges to the fairness of the
policy must be addressed to them.
K 311 would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
H 32 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Justice
WILKINS' concurring and dissenting opinion.
Utah,2000.
State ex rel. Office of Recovery Services v. McCoy
999 P.2d 572, 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 39
END OF DOCUMENT
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Houghton v. Department of Health
Utah,2005.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Paul HOUGHTON and Billie Henderson,
individually and each as representative of a class;
and Damian Henderson, Wayne Rubens, Ron Roes,
and Susan Roes, who are other members of these
classes, similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; The Office of
Recovery Services; The Department of Human
Services; The State of Utah; Rod L. Betit, Director
of the Department of Health and Director of
Department of Human Services; Emma Chacone,
Executive Director of the Office of Recovery
Services; and John Does 1-50 and Jane Does 1-50,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20030931.

(1) notice of claim by accident victims satisfied
requirement of Governmental immunity Act;
(2) an opinion interpreting scope of prior Supreme
Court decision, affecting when State had to pay fees
of attorneys who represented Medicaid recipients,
would not be purely advisory, as clarifying the
holding would have the effect of either expanding
or contracting the scope of discovery and the
composition of the class; and
(3) State's obligation to pay its share of attorney
fees of accident victims was not dependent upon
whether the accident victims expressly excluded the
State's claim when they pursued their claims against
third parties.

Reversed and remanded.

Sept. 27, 2005.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 2005.
Background: Accident victims who had received
Medicaid assistance to pay their medical bills
brought class action against Department of Health
and the Office of Recovery Services (State) seeking
recovery of monies paid to the State from
settlements or judgments on victims' behalf. The
District Court, Salt Lake County, Ronald Nehring,
J., granted State's motion for summary judgment.
Accident victims appealed. The Supreme Court, 57
P.3d 1067, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. On remand, the Third District, Salt Lake,
Anthony B. Quinn, J., denied accident victims'
motion to compel discovery and granted State's
motion for a protective order. Accident victims
petitioned for interlocutory appeal.

Holdings: After granting petition, the Supreme
Court, Parrish, J., held that:

See also 962 P.2d 58.
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procedures in Governmental Immunity Act is
mandated, such notices are not required to meet the
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notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so that
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West's U.C.A. § 63-30-1 l(Repealed).
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West's U.C.A. § 63-30-11 (Repealed); Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 23(a).
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9Z Constitutional Law
92XX Separation of Powers
92XX(C) Judicial Powers and Functions
92XX(C)6 Advisory Opinions
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An opinion is not merely advisory, if it will, in fact,
have a meaningful effect on the parties.
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92k2603
Particular
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and
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92k2604 k. In General. Most Cited
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An opinion interpreting scope of prior Supreme
Court decision, affecting when State had to pay fees
of attorneys who represented Medicaid recipients
when the State obtained lien reimbursement for
Medicaid assistance from a settlement or judgment,
would have a meaningful effect and thus would not
be "purely advisory," in interlocutory appeal of
discovery orders in class action brought by accident
victims who had received Medicaid assistance and
were seeking recovery of their attorney fees from
monies paid to the State from settlements or
judgments, where discovery orders restricted
accident victims' discovery based on trial court's
interpretation of such prior Supreme Court case,
and clarifying the holding of such case would have
the effect of either expanding or contracting the
scope of discovery and the composition of the class.
U.C.A.1953, 26-19-5, 26-19-7(2004).
[14] Appeal and Error 30 €=^842(1)
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Interpreting case law presents a question of law, and
accordingly a trial court's interpretation of case law
is reviewed for correctness.
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198H Health
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198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
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198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk496 Third Persons, Recovery
from
198Hk496(2) k. Tortfeasors in
General. Most Cited Cases
Health 198H €=^497
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk497
k.
Settlements
or
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
Medical Benefits Recovery Act contemplates that a
Medicaid recipient may proceed with an
independent action against a third party who caused
injuries which required the recipient to seek medical
care in cases where the State denies consent to
include the State's claim; however, the Act imposes
no express obligation on the recipient to expressly
exclude the State's claim in such cases, and instead
language in the Act serves to preserve the State's
claim against the third party whether or not the
recipient expressly excludes the State's claim from
his own action or negotiations, putting the third
party on notice that, in the absence of the State's
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written consent, the State will not be bound by any
representations made by a recipient as to whether
the State's claim is included, nor will the State be
bound by any release of claims signed by a
recipient. West's U.C.A. §§ 26-19-1 to 26-19-19.
[16] Health 198H €==>496(2)
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk496 Third Persons, Recovery
from
198Hk496(2) k. Tortfeasors in
General. Most Cited Cases
Health 198H €==>497
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;,
Medicaid ,
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk497
k.
Settlements
or
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
The State is obligated to pay its share of attorney
fees, incurred by a Medicaid recipient when the
recipient pursues a claim against a third party who
caused the injuries which required the recipient to
seek medical care, if either the State consents to the
recipient's request to represent its interest, or if the
State satisfies its lien from proceeds procured
through the efforts of the recipient's attorney in
those cases where the recipient requested, but was
denied, consent, and the State's obligation is not
dependent upon whether the recipient expressly
excluded the State's claim when the recipient
pursued its claim against the third party. West's
U.C.A. §§ 26-19-1 to 26-19-19.
[17] Health 198H €^496(2)

Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk496 Third Persons, Recovery
from
198Hk496(2) k. Tortfeasors in
General. Most Cited Cases
Health 198H €=M97
198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk497
k.
Settlements
or
Judgments, Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
A Medicaid recipient's failure to expressly exclude
the State's claim for reimbursement of Medicaid
expenses, when the recipient pursues a claim
against a third party who caused the injuries which
required the recipient to seek medical care, does not
prejudice the State's claim for reimbursement.
West's U.C.A. §§ 26-19-1 to 26-19-19.

*862 Robert B. Sykes, Alyson Carter, Robert J.
Fuller, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants.
PARRISH, Justice:
T[ 1 In 1995, plaintiffs filed suit against the
Department of Health, the Office of Recovery
Services, the State of Utah, and individual
defendants (collectively, the "State"), seeking the
return of monies paid to the State from settlements
or judgments entered on plaintiffs' behalf. After
several years of protracted motion practice and two
appeals to this court, plaintiffs now appeal the
district court's interlocutory order limiting the scope
of discovery. The district court based its *863
order on its interpretation of Utah case law.
Because we conclude that the district court erred in
its interpretation, we reverse and remand.

198H Health
198HIII Government Assistance
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
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^[ 2 As a result of injuries they sustained in
separate accidents, plaintiffs Paul Houghton, Billie
and Damien Henderson, and Wayne Rubens each
received Medicaid assistance to pay their medical
bills. After plaintiffs sought compensation for their
injuries from potentially liable third parties, the
State, pursuant to section 26-19-5 of the Utah Code
(the "lien statute"), FN1 placed reimbursement liens
on any settlement or judgment proceeds in order to
recover the Medicaid assistance it had paid on
plaintiffs' behalf.
FN1. At all times relevant to this action,
subsection (1) of section 26-19-5 provided:
(1) (a) When the department provides or
becomes obligated to provide medical
assistance to a recipient because of an
injury, disease, or disability that a third
party is obligated to pay for, the
department may recover the medical
assistance directly from that third party,
(b) The department's claim to recover
medical assistance provided as a result of
the injury, disease, or disability is a lien
against any proceeds payable to or on
behalf of the recipient by that third party.
This lien has priority over all other claims
to the proceeds, except claims for
attorney's fees and costs authorized under
Subsection 26-19-7(4).
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(1) (1998).
This subsection was amended in 2004 and
now reads as follows:
(1) (a) When the department provides or
becomes obligated to provide medical
assistance to a recipient that a third party is
obligated to pay for, the department may
recover the medical assistance directly
from that third party.
(b) Any claim arising under Subsection
(l)(a) or Section 26-19-4.5 to recover
medical assistance provided to a recipient
is a lien against any proceeds payable to or
on behalf of the recipient by that third
party. This lien has priority over all other
claims to the proceeds, except claims for
attorney's fees and costs authorized under
Subsection 26-19-7(4).

Id. § 26-19-5(1) (Supp.2004). Because
the 1998 version of section 26-19-5 was
applicable at all times relevant to this
action, all subsequent references to this
section are to the 1998 version.
K 3 Alleging that the lien statute violated federal
law, plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with the State
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act (the "Immunity Act").
FN2
The notice stated that plaintiffs "intendfed] to
bring a class action" to recover "the money [the
State] took illegally by liening their property ... plus
any interest, costs and attorneys fees." Plaintiffs
attached to their notice a draft complaint, which
sought the return of all "monies ... illegally and
unlawfully taken" and "attorneys fees as allowed by
law."

FN2. In 2004, the Utah Legislature
repealed the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, sections 63-30-1 to -38, enacting in its
place sections 63-30d-101 to -904. Act of
Mar. 3, 2004, ch. 267, 2004 Utah Laws
1171. In so doing, the legislature
acknowledged its intent that all "injuries
alleged to be caused by a governmental
entity that occurred before July 1, 2004, be
governed by the provisions" of the former
Act Id. § 48, at 1215. Because the
injuries alleged by plaintiffs in this case
occurred prior to July 1, 2004, the former
Act governs and all references in this
opinion are to that Act.
H 4 On October 27, 1995, plaintiffs filed suit
against the State, alleging that the lien statute was
illegal because it violated federal law prohibiting
the filing of liens against the property of living
Medicaid recipients. On December 18, 1995,
plaintiffs moved to certify their suit as a class
action, and on January 29, 1996, the district court
granted the motion, certifying two classes of
plaintiffs. Class I consisted of Medicaid recipients
with third-party liability claims who received
settlements or judgments from liable third parties
from which the State's reimbursement liens were
paid. Class II plaintiffs were identical to Class I
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plaintiffs with the exception that Class II plaintiffs
had "retained counsel and actually filed actions or
made claims through attorneys[ ] against the liable
third parties."
^ 5 After plaintiffs filed a notice of deposition and
request for document production, the State moved
to disqualify plaintiffs' attorneys, asserting that their
re£>resentation of plaintiffs gave rise to a conflict of
interest in violation of rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct because plaintiffs' attorneys
had previously represented the State in personal
injury actions brought by Medicaid recipients. In
addition, the State sought *864 a protective order to
delay discovery pending the resolution of its motion
to disqualify. The district court granted both
motions. Plaintiffs petitioned this court for
permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which we
granted. In that appeal, we reversed the district
court, holding that plaintiffs' counsel did not violate
rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 63 (Utah
1998). On remand, the district court reinstated
plaintiffs' counsel.
^ 6 In late 1998, this court issued two opinions
affirming the validity of the lien statute. See S.S. v.
State, 972 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1998); Wallace v.
Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, 448 (Utah 1998).
Arguing that those opinions completely disposed of
plaintiffs' claims, the State moved for judgment on
the pleadings. While plaintiffs conceded that S.S.
and Wallace gutted their challenge to the validity of
the lien statute, they maintained the viability of their
other claims. The district court granted the State's
motion for judgment on the pleadings on all of
plaintiffs' claims except their claim seeking the
State's contribution to their attorney fees.
U 7 Undeterred, the State filed another motion
directed at plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees. The
State argued that it was entitled to summary
judgment on that claim because the named plaintiffs
either never incurred attorney fees or already had
been compensated by the State for its share of fees.
Plaintiffs opposed the State's motion and also
sought reconsideration of the district court's ruling
disposing of their other claims. Plaintiffs argued
that, in addition to their claim for attorney fees, they
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

should be allowed to proceed with their claim
seeking to invalidate the priority status of the State's
lien.
f 8 The district court disposed of both motions in
an order dated November 13, 2000. It denied
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, citing this
court's decision in State ex rel Office of Recovery
Services v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572, and
it granted the State's motion for summary judgment,
declaring that "no issues related to a named plaintiff
or class representative remain unresolved."
U 9 Plaintiffs again appealed to this court, arguing
that the district court erred in (1) granting the State's
motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect
to their claim challenging the validity of the lien's
priority status, and (2) granting the State's motion
for summary judgment on the Class II plaintiffs'
claims for attorney fees.
% 10 In Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002
UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067, we affirmed the district
court's grant of judgment on the pleadings, holding
that "the priority lien on Medicaid recipients'
third-party settlement proceeds did not violate
federal law." Id. K 9. However, we reversed the
summary judgment on the Class II plaintiffs' claim
for attorney fees and remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings on that claim.
Id. K 10.
^[ 11 On remand, the Class II plaintiffs moved to
compel discovery. Again, the State fired up its
motion machine. It moved to dismiss without
prejudice the Class II plaintiffs' remaining claim for
attorney fees, arguing that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over that claim because
plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Immunity
Act. In the alternative, the State argued that the
district court should compel plaintiffs to add a new
Class II representative because none of the named
representatives could assert a valid claim for
attorney fees. The State also moved to stay all
discovery pending the district court's resolution of
its motion to dismiss, which the district court
denied. Thereafter, plaintiffs moved to add
additional Class II representatives, and the State
responded by filing an additional motion to dismiss.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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The State asserted that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over those additional plaintiffs sought
to be named as Class II representatives, as well as
all other unnamed Class II plaintiffs, because the
notice of claim filed with the State had not
specifically listed them. Additionally, the State
moved for a protective order, arguing that plaintiffs'
discovery requests were overly broad and unduly
burdensome, and sought protected information. The
district court granted plaintiffs' motion to add Class
II representatives and denied the State's motions
*865 to dismiss. The State then moved to
decertify the class.
^[ 12 On November 3, 2003, in an order disposing
of the remaining motions before it, the district court
(1) denied plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery,
(2) granted the State's motion for a protective order,
limiting the discovery that plaintiffs could seek, and
(3) delayed a decision on the State's motion for
decertification of the class until after the parties
completed the discovery allowed under the terms of
the protective order.
U 13 The district court based its November 3, 2003
order on the holding of McCoy, which, it declared, "
is found in the last sentence of paragraph 18 of that
case." That sentence reads:
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4),
when the State elects to recover directly from a
recipient who has expressly excluded the State's
claim from any attempt to recover from a third
party, the State must pay the attorney fees incurred
in procuring the State's share of the settlement
proceeds.
McCoy, 2000 UT 39, f 18, 999 P.2d 572. The
district court accordingly limited the scope of
discovery to that which was necessary to identify
Medicaid recipients falling within its interpretation
of the holding of McCoy. On November 21, 2003,
plaintiffs petitioned for permission to appeal the
district court's interlocutory discovery order,
arguing that the district court's interpretation of
McCoy was erroneous. We granted plaintiffs'
petition on January 15, 2004, and have jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j) (2002).

© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No
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\ 14 Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in
interpreting the holding of State ex rel Office oj
Recovery Services v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d
572. Contrary to the district court's interpretation,
plaintiffs maintain that McCoy requires the State to
pay its fair share of attorney fees in all instances
where the State obtains its lien reimbursement from
the proceeds of a settlement or judgment procured
through the efforts of a Medicaid recipient's private
attorney. Before we reach this issue, however, we
must address the preliminary arguments raised by
the State. Specifically, the State contends that (1)
we cannot address plaintiffs' claims because we lack
subject matter jurisdiction to do so; and (2)
assuming we have jurisdiction, we should
nevertheless decline to further interpret McCoy
because doing so would constitute an impermissible
advisory opinion.

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
K 15 The State contends that we lack subject
matter jurisdiction over this case because plaintiffs
failed to comply with the Immunity Act.
Specifically, the State argues that plaintiffs' notice
of claim was deficient because it did not list all of
the Class II plaintiffs and did not include a specific
request for attorney fees under section 26-19-7 of
the Utah Code.
[1][2][3][4] U 16 Before reaching the substance of
the State's jurisdictional claim, we must determine
whether that claim falls within the scope of this
interlocutory appeal. Although it is generally true
that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction "is a
threshold issue," which can be raised at any time
and must be addressed before the merits of other
claims, Hous. Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 1f 11,
44 P.3d 724, this is not the case in the context of an
interlocutory appeal. On interlocutory appeal, we
review only those specific issues presented in the
petition. See State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, % 32, 37
P.3d 1103 (refusing to address a question because it
was "beyond the scope of review for which we
granted Lusk's petition for this interlocutory appeal"
). Thus, we are not compelled to review subject
matter jurisdiction if that issue was neither included
in the petition for interlocutory appeal nor the
to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works.
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subject of a cross-petition See Mercury Mktg
Techs of Del, Inc v State ex rel Beebe, No
03-1382, 358 Ark 319, —SW3d — , — , 2004
WL 1475391, 2004 Ark LEXIS 447, at *13-14
(Ark July 1, 2004) (declining to address "whether
the circuit court erred in finding that it had
subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, because
this went beyond the scope of the interlocutory
aripeal") Nevertheless, because the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction will always bear some
relationship*866 to the interlocutory orders
presented for review, we retain the discretion to
address subject matter jurisdiction on interlocutory
appeal m those cases where we deem it appropriate
Where we decline to do so, the parties may appeal
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction once a final
decision has been rendered, as mere demal of a
petition for interlocutory appeal does not
necessanly act as a judgment on the merits, see
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co v Atkin, Wright &
Miles, 681 P2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1984), and " c
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction
cannot
be waived,' " Chen v Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 1J 34,
100 P 3d 1177 (quotmg Barnard v Wassermann,
855 P 2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993))

statutory rights of action agamst itself, any
conditions placed on those rights must be followed
precisely' " 2002 UT 16, % 11, 40 P 3d 632
(quotmg Hall, 2001 UT 34, H 23, 24 P 3d 958)
Accordmgly, "[compliance with the Immumty Act
is a prerequisite to vestmg a district court with
subject matter jurisdiction over claims against
governmental entities " Id ^ 9.

Tf 17 Because of the lengthy procedural history m
this case, we believe that it is appropriate to address
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at this stage,
even though it is not within the scope of the petition
for interlocutory appeal Accordingly, we exercise
our discretion to review the issue of whether
plaintiffs complied with the Immunity Act, thereby
vesting the district court with subject matter
jurisdiction over their claims agamst the State

FN3 This court has recognized that
equitable claims are not governed by the
notice of claim provisions of the Immunity
Act
For example, m El Rancho
Enterprises, Inc v Murray City Corp,
565 P 2d 778, 780 (Utah 1977), we noted
that "an equitable claim may be brought
without the necessity of first presenting a
claim for damages " See also Am Tierra
Corp v City of W Jordan, 840 P 2d 757,
760 (Utah 1992) (holding that equitable
claims are "exempt from the filing
requirements and time limits imposed by
the
Immunity Act"), Jenkins v Swan,
675 P2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983) ("
[Ejquitable claims
are exempt from the
notice requirements") Thus, a plaintiff
asserting an equitable claim is not bound
by the notice requirements of the Immunity
Act

[5][6] \ 18 The Immunity Act, sections 63-30-1 to
-38 of the Utah Code, "grants the state and its
political subdivisions 'broad, background immunity
' from injuries that result due to the exercise of a
governmental function" Wheeler v McPherson,
2002 UT 16, H 10, 40 P 3d 632 (quoting Hall v
State Dep't of Corr, 2001 UT 34, \ 18, 24 P 3d
958) The Act waives this immunity for certain
claims and specifies the procedures that claimants
must follow in order to maintain an action agamst
the State or its political subdivisions SeeUtah
Code Ann §§ 63-30-4 to -13 (1997) In Wheeler,
we reasoned that, " '[w]here the government grants
© 2007 Thomson/West No

[7] [8] K 19 The State alleges two deficiencies m
plaintiffs' notice of claim First, the State contends
that the notice failed to sufficiently articulate the
claim for attorney fees that plaintiffs now seek
Second, the State contends that the notice was
ineffective because it did not identify by name all of
the plaintiffs to this action Plaintiffs disagree,
asserting that their notice was sufficient
Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that they were not
required to comply with the notice of claim
requirements because their claims are equitable m
nature FN3 Because we conclude that plaintiffs'
notice of claim satisfied the requirements of the
Immunity Act, it is unnecessary for us to address
whether plaintiffs' claims are, m actuality, equitable

[9] H 20Section 63-30-11 of the Immunity Act
provides that "[a]ny person havmg a claim for
to Ong U S Govt Works
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injury against a governmental entity ... shall file a
written notice of claim with the entity before
maintaining an action." Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-11(2). The notice must contain "(i) a brief
statement of the facts; (ii) the nature of the claim
asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the
claimant so far as they are known." Id. §
63-30-1 l(3)(a). The purpose of the notice "is to *
provide[ ] the governmental entity an opportunity to
correct the condition that caused the injury, evaluate
the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the
expense of litigation.' " Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v.
Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, H 10, 42 P.3d 379
(quoting Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d
343, 345-46 (Utah 1998)) (alteration in *867
original). To ensure that this purpose is fulfilled,
we have repeatedly required strict compliance with
the notice of claim provisions. For example, in
Wheeler,"w reiteratefd] ... that the Immunity Act
demands strict compliance with its requirements to
allow suit against governmental entities. The
notice of claim provision, particularly, neither
contemplates nor allows for anything less." 2002
UT 16, % 13, 40 P.3d 632 (emphasis added).
[10] Tf 21 Although we have mandated strict
compliance with the notice of claim procedures, we
have not required that such notices " 'meet the
standards required to state a claim for relief "
Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, K 11, 100
P.3d 254 (quoting Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp.,
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983)). Rather, a
plaintiff need only include "enough specificity in
the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so
that the defendant can appraise its potential liability.
" Years ley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah
1990). Applying this standard, we conclude that
plaintiffs' notice of claim satisfied the requirements
of the Immunity Act with respect to both its
description of the claims and its identification of the
plaintiffs.
^ 22 First, we conclude that plaintiffs satisfied the
requirement to "set forth ... the nature of the claim
asserted,"Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(ii),
thereby affording the State an opportunity "to
appraise its potential liability," Yearsley, 798 P.2d
at 1129. Plaintiffs attached a draft complaint to
their notice. The draft included several statements
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

that sufficiently communicated plaintiffs, claim for
attorney fees. For example, the draft complaint
requested "attorneys' fees as may be provided by
law." Because plaintiffs seek recovery of attorney
fees under section 26-19-7 of the Utah Code, they
are seeking recovery of attorney fees "as may be
provided
by
law."
Additionally,
although
plaintiffs' draft complaint focused heavily on the
issue of the lien statute's constitutionality, it also
sought relief for "monies ... [that] were illegally and
unlawfully taken." Because plaintiffs may be
entitled to contribution from the State for attorney
fees under section 26-19-7, any retention of those
fees by the State would constitute "monies illegally
and unlawfully taken."
H 23 Moreover, plaintiffs should not be penalized
because their notice of claim failed to accurately
predict future developments in the law. When
plaintiffs filed their notice, the question of the lien
statute's constitutionality had yet to be decided.
Because plaintiffs were challenging the validity of
the State's entire lien, it was unnecessary for them to
also include a separate claim seeking recovery of
only their attorney fees. The fact that this court
subsequently
upheld
the
lien
statute's
constitutionality should not bar plaintiffs' attempt to
recover a portion of the funds they originally
sought. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs'
notice of claim was sufficient to communicate the
nature of the claim they now assert.
[11] U 24 We similarly conclude that plaintiffs'
notice of claim was not deficient even though it did
not expressly include the name of each potential
Class II plaintiff. Relying on our holding in Pigs
Gun Club, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379, the State
asserts that a notice of claim must contain the name
of each individual plaintiff. In Pigs Gun Club, we
declared that "[section 63-30-11] itself clearly
requires any person filing suit against a
governmental agency to file a notice of claim. In
other words, each plaintiffs name must be on the
notice of claim." Id. ^ 10 (citation omitted).
Unlike this case, however, Pigs Gun Club was not a
class action. That distinction is significant because
interpreting the notice of claim provision to require
identification of every potential plaintiff in a class
action lawsuit would nullify our class action rule,
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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which provides that "[o]ne or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all." Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis
added). Nothing in the Immunity Act suggests that
the State declined to waive immunity from class
action lawsuits. Accordingly, we hold that a claim
providing notice of a possible class action lawsuit
satisfies the requirements of the Immunity Act if it
isA filed by a class representative on behalf of
potential class members. Cf. Moreno v. Bd. oj
Educ, 926 P.2d 886, 892 (Utah 1996) (holding that
the notice of claim filed by a *868 guardian in a
wrongful death action, even though erroneously
filed on the guardian's own behalf, was sufficient to
preserve the parent's claim because the guardian
was legally authorized to file a claim on behalf of
the parent). The notice of claim in this case met
that requirement. It was filed by the claimants "
individually and ... as representative^] of a class."
Because plaintiffs' notice of claim complied with
the requirements of the Immunity Act, we hold that
we possess subject matter jurisdiction over their
claims against the State.
II. ADVISORY OPINION
Tf 25 Plaintiffs sought interlocutory review of the
protective order entered by the district court. On
appeal, however, plaintiffs do not restrict their
arguments to the scope of the protective order.
Rather, they assert that "a number of other
questions have arisen regarding [our opinion in
McCoy, 2000 UT 39] that should be resolved to
avoid further appeals." The State contends that the
district court correctly applied the McCoy decision
when fashioning the protective order and that
plaintiffs' request for additional guidance in
interpreting McCoy calls for an impermissible
advisory opinion.
[12] f 26 We repeatedly have declined invitations
to issue advisory opinions. In State v. Ortiz, 1999
UT 84, 987 P.2d 39, we declared:
"This court will not issue advisory opinions or
examine a controversy that has not yet sharpened
into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and
obligations between the parties thereto. Where
there exists no more than a difference of opinion
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

regarding the hypothetical application of a piece of
legislation to a situation in which the parties might,
at some future time, find themselves, the question is
unripe for adjudication."
Id. ^ 3 (quoting State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359,
371 (Utah 1995) (further quotations omitted)); see
also Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ^
22, 86 P.3d 735 ("We have observed on many
occasions that this court is not inclined to issue
mere
advisory
opinions."(internal
quotations
omitted)). An opinion is not merely advisory,
however, if it will, in fact, have a "meaningful effect
" on the parties. See Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f
22, 86 P.3d 735. The opinion we are asked to
render in this case would have such an effect.
[13] K 27 The scope of the protective order sentered
by the district court was dependent on its
interpretation of McCoy. After limiting discovery
to issues relevant to class certification, the district
court defined the scope of permissible discovery,
stating that "[p]laintiffs^ may thereby pursue .the
identification of recipients who fall within the
holding of the McCoy case as construed by this
Order." Clarifying the holding of McCoy will have
the effect of either expanding or contracting the
scope of discovery and will define the composition
of the class. Thus, our opinion will have a "
meaningful effect" on the parties.
^f 28 Although we are obliged to decide whether
the protective order was grounded upon the correct
interpretation of McCoy, we agree with the State
that plaintiffs have asked us to address other issues
that do not bear upon the scope of the protective
order.FN4 Because it would be inappropriate for us
to address all of the hypothetical "related questions"
posed by plaintiffs, we will restrict our opinion to
the appropriate scope of the protective order,
addressing the related questions only to the extent
that they have a bearing on the scope of that order.
Indeed, it would be premature for us to opine as to
plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees in all of the
fact scenarios contemplated by their questions when
discovery has yet to reveal whether those scenarios
are even present in this case.
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FN4. For example, plaintiffs ask us to
opine as to whether the State's obligation
to pay "its fair share of a recipient's
attorney fees [is] dependent upon the
degree of cooperation by the recipient."
They further ask whether the State should
be required to "pay a fair share of a
recipient's attorney fees if it hires its own
attorney."
f 29 Before addressing the scope of the protective
order, we pause to note that the apparent confusion
in this area of the law and the number of situations
unaddressed by *869 the Medicaid lien statute cry
out for legislative attention. This is especially so
given the frequency with which this court has been
confronted with disputes regarding application of
the lien statute.
H 30 It is clear that the State has a legitimate and
definite interest in obtaining reimbursement of
funds paid to Medicaid recipients. This interest
would appear to be furthered by a scheme in which
private attorneys - have an incentive to seek
recoveries benefitting the State. However, without
a definitive set of parameters defining the terms and
conditions under which private attorneys will be
compensated for their efforts, those attorneys will
have little or no incentive to seek recoveries
benefitting the State.™5 Consequently, the State,
the Medicaid recipients, and the private attorneys
who represent them would all benefit from
definable rules and a clear expression of policy in
this area.

FN5. The State argues persuasively that it
should not be forced to pay fees to private
attorneys
for
obtaining
Medicaid
reimbursement in those cases where the
State
could
have
secured
the
reimbursement itself with little or no effort.
On the other hand, plaintiffs argue
persuasively that the State often refuses to
compensate the attorneys of Medicaid
recipients in cases where the State's
reimbursement is entirely attributable to
the efforts of private attorneys and where
the State would not otherwise have
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

obtained a recovery. Plaintiffs assert that
it is fundamentally unfair to allow the State
a "free ride" in such situations and that the
"free ride [will] be the last ride when
attorneys discover there is no incentive to
take a recipient's case if all proceeds are
taken by the State."
f 31 The legislature, with its ability to "provide a
forum for full discussion and consideration of the
pros and cons of the problems involved, and to
enact into law those policies which, in [its]
judgment, will best serve the common welfare,"
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah 1980)
(Crockett, C.J., dissenting), is the appropriate body
to undertake this task. Furthermore, because the
legislature, unlike this court, is not constrained to
address a single case at a time, it is able to devise a
comprehensive scheme, providing predictability and
appropriate incentives to the State, the Medicaid
recipients, and their private attorneys. We hope the
legislature will do so.

III. DID THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRET
Citing our holding in McCoy, the district court ruled
that plaintiffs were entitled to recover attorney fees
from the State only in cases where "the State elects
to recover directly from a recipient who has
expressly excluded the State's claim from any
attempt to recover from a third party." State ex rel.
Office of Recovery Servs. v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, ^
18, 999 P.2d 572. The protective order entered by
the district court limited discovery accordingly.
Plaintiffs contend that the district court's ruling on
this issue was erroneous. Specifically, they assert
that they are entitled to recover attorney fees from
the State in any case where the State obtained a lien
reimbursement through the efforts of a recipient's
private attorney. The State counters that attorney
fees may be recovered only in those cases where (1)
the recipient requested consent, (2) the recipient
excluded from his or her claim the amount of the
State's lien, and (3) the State failed to seek
reimbursement from the liable party and elected
instead to obtain reimbursement directly from the
Medicaid recipient.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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[14] ^[ 32 Interpreting case law presents a question
of law. State ex rel. Office of Recovery Servs. v.
Streight, 2004 UT 88, If 6, 108 P.3d 690.
Accordingly, we review the district court's
interpretation of our ruling in McCoy for
correctness. Id.
U 33 Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees in
Medicaid lien cases is governed by section 26-19-7
of the Utah Code, which provides:
(l)(a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence
an action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a
claim against a third party for recovery of medical
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which
the department has provided or has become
obligated to provide medical assistance, without the
department's written consent.
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of
its total recovery for attorney's*870 fees, but shall
pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action
that is commenced with the department's written
consent.

Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-19-1 to -19 (1998)
(amended 2004), entitled the State to the proceeds
and superseded any efforts by McCoy to insulate his
client's recovery from the State's reach. McCoy,
2000 UT 39, 1f 12, 999 P.2d 572. Thus, to the
extent McCoy attempted to utilize his exclusion of
the State's claim as a tactic to avoid satisfying the
State's lien, this court rejected that tactic. We did,
however, allow McCoy to recover a proportionate
share of his attorney fees from the State, reasoning
that McCoy had "followed the requirements of the
Act" by asking for the State's consent. Id. f 18.
1f 36 The State asserts that the district court was
correct in limiting the holding of McCoy to the last
sentence of the eighteenth paragraph, where we
declared:
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4),
when the State elects to recover directly from a
recipient who has expressly excluded the State's
claim from any attempt to recover from a third
party, the State must pay the attorney fees incurred
in procuring the State's share of the settlement
proceeds.

Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(1), (4) (1998).
Id. (emphasis added).
If 34 In McCoy, we were asked to consider whether
the defendant, an attorney hired by a Medicaid
recipient to recover damages for an injury he
sustained in a slip and fall, was entitled to attorney
fees from the State under section 26-19-7(4). 2000
UT 39, ffif 2-3, 13, 999 P.2d 572. Before
initiating any claim or suit against the liable third
party, McCoy requested consent from the State to
bring a claim on its behalf. Id. If 3. The State
refused. Id. Thereafter, McCoy filed a claim
against the liable third party, expressly excluding
the State's claim for the medical assistance it had
provided. Id. Iflf 3-4. The liable third party
agreed to settle the claim and paid the Medicaid
recipient. Id. If 5. The State then filed suit against
McCoy to recover its lien from the settlement
proceeds held in trust by McCoy. Id. If 6. McCoy
resisted, arguing that because he had excluded the
State's claim, the State was not entitled to any
proceeds that he obtained. Id. % 11.
% 35 This court rejected McCoy's argument,
holding that the Utah Medical Benefits Recovery
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

1f 37 Contrary to the State's assertion, this language
does not constitute McCoy's holding of general
application. When read in the context of the
opinion as a whole, it is apparent that this language
constitutes only the ruling, or the application of the
general holding to the specific facts of the case.
See Black's Law Dictionary 1334 (7th ed.1999)
(noting that "[I]n common usage 'legal ruling' ... is
a term ordinarily used to signify the outcome of
applying a legal test when that outcome is one of
relatively narrow impact. The immediate effect is
to decide an issue in a single case."(internal
quotations omitted)). We acknowledged as much
in McCoy, in the sentences immediately preceding
the passage now cited by the State as the "holding,"
when we stated:
We see no justification for so limiting the relatively
broad reach of subsection (4) in the case before us.
In fact, it would be inherently unfair not to award
attorney fees to McCoy, who has followed the
requirements of the Act in securing a recovery on
behalf of his client. We therefore conclude that
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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under subsection (4), when the State elects to
recover directly from a recipient who has expressly
excluded the State's claim from any attempt to
recover from a third party, the State must pay the
attorney fees incurred in procuring the State's share
of the settlement proceeds.
Id* (emphasis added). In short, our specific ruling
in McCoy was based on the fact that the State
sought to recover its lien directly from the recipient
after McCoy had requested, and was denied,
consent and after the recipient had excluded the
State's claim from his efforts to obtain a recovery.
At IK 3, 6.
TI 38 In this case, we are asked to clarify the
holding of McCoy as it relates to the scope of a
discovery
order concerning potential
class
members. Under such a circumstance, there is no
need to restrict discovery to the class of cases that
present fact patterns identical to the one presented
in *871 McCoy. In a context where few, if any,
facts have been developed, it is necessary to reach
beyond the narrow, fact-specific ruling of McCoy
and apply its broader, more general holding.
Doing otherwise would artificially and illogically
restrict discovery and, concomitantly, the size of the
potential class. Until the facts surrounding the
claims of each potential class member have been
developed, it will be impossible for the court to
assess whether they fall within the general holding
of McCoy.
% 39 In an effort to define the appropriate scope of
the protective order, we return to the underpinnings
of our decision in McCoy. In McCoy, we
concluded that the State was obligated to pay a
proportionate share of the plaintiffs attorney fees
because the plaintiff complied with section 26-19-7
of the Medicaid lien statute. Id. ^ 18. We based
this conclusion on the fact that McCoy had
requested consent to pursue the State's claim.
^ 40 Our reliance on this factor was mandated by
the terms of the lien statute, which prohibits a
Medicaid recipient from seeking recovery of funds
advanced by the State without the State's written
consent. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7. Where
Medicaid recipients failed to comply with the

statute, they were not entitled to a contribution from
the State for their attorney fees. The lien statute
fails to address, however, the State's obligation to
pay its fair share of attorney fees in those cases
where consent was requested from, but denied by,
the State and the State nevertheless elects to obtain
its recovery from the proceeds obtained through the
efforts of a Medicaid recipient's attorney.
Accordingly,
[i]n McCoy, on grounds of fairness, we interpreted
the statute to imply an obligation on the part of the
State to pay fees where the attorney acted in
compliance with the statute, requesting consent to
pursue an action and then preserving the State's
independent right to recover by excluding the
State's claim from any action filed on behalf of the
injured party.
Streight, 2004 UT 88, f 13, 108 P.3d €90. This
holding "struck a balance between the State's
interest in protecting itself from collusive efforts to
place otherwise reimbursable funds beyond its reach
and the interest of private attorneys in being
compensated for obtaining recoveries benefitting
the State." Id.
\ 41 The question left open by our decision in
McCoy, and our subsequent decision in Streight, is
whether the State's obligation to pay its fair share of
attorney fees is limited to cases exactly like McCoy,
where the recipient expressly excluded the State's
claim and the State recovered its lien directly from
the proceeds paid to the Medicaid recipient. In its
effort to limit its obligation to such cases, the State
relies on language from McCoy suggesting that the
State is not obligated to pay attorney fees if it elects
to recover its lien directly from the liable third
party. See McCoy, 2000 UT 39, ffil 18-19, 999
P.2d 572. In so arguing, however, the State
overemphasizes the particular language at the
expense of the underlying principle.
1f 42 In McCoy, we noted that, "[hjaving elected
not to recover directly from the third party ..., the
State not only incurred a responsibility to pay
attorney fees, but also effectively reduced [the
recipient's] net recovery." Id. f 18 n. 5. The
phrase "recover directly from the third party" was
used to identify those cases where the State
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recovered its lien independent of the recipient's
settlement and thereby did not reduce the amount
recovered by the recipient. That language was not
intended to encompass situations in which the
State's lien was paid directly from the settlement
proceeds obtained through the efforts of the
recipient's attorney. After refusing to consent to
representation by the recipient's attorney, the State
should not be free to recover its lien from the
settlement or judgment obtained through the efforts
of the recipient's attorney without incurring the
obligation to pay its fair share of attorney fees.
Tf 43 Moreover, the State's obligation for fees
should not be dependent upon whether the State
obtained its reimbursement directly from the
Medicaid recipient or whether it was able to arrange
for payment directly from the liable third party.
Permitting the State to circumvent any obligation
for attorney fees by arranging for payment directly
from a liable third party, even though the *872
settlement or judgment from which the lien is paid
was procured through the efforts of the recipient's
attorney, would sanction the State's abrogation of its
responsibility to recover its lien "by relying on
Medicaid recipients to act, usually unwittingly, on
the State's behalf." Streight, 2004 UT 88, \ 21,
108 P.3d 690 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). Such a
result would defeat the equitable basis for our ruling
in McCoy. See id. ^ 13 (majority opinion).
\ 44 Additionally, relieving the State of its
obligation to pay its fair share of attorney fees
simply because the Medicaid recipient failed to
expressly exclude the State's claim would similarly
defeat the equitable basis of our ruling in McCoy.
In fact, the Medical Benefits Recovery Act does not
impose an express exclusion requirement on those
who wish to proceed with their own claims after the
State has denied them permission to press the
State's claim on its behalf. The Act provides:
A recipient may not file a claim, commence an
action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a
claim against a third party for recovery of medical
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which
the department has provided or has become
obligated to provide medical assistance, without the
department's written consent.
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(l)(a).
[15] \ 45 Read in isolation, this language might
conceivably be understood to imply an express
exclusion requirement on the basis that such an
exclusion would be necessary to preserve the State's
claim. Significantly, however, this section of the
Act further states that, "[i]f the recipient proceeds
without the department's written consent as required
by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound
by any decision, judgment,
agreement, or
compromise rendered or made on the claim or in
the action,""/. § 26-19-7(2)(a) (emphasis added),
and that "[t]he department ...retains its right to
commence an independent action against the third
party,"id. § 26-19-7(2)(b) (emphasis added). The
Act thus contemplates that a Medicaid recipient
may proceed with an independent action in cases
where the State denies consent to include the State's *
claim. However, the Act imposes no express
obligation on the Medicaid recipient to expressly
exclude the State's claim in such cases. Instead,
section 26-19-7 itself, by its plain language, serves
to preserve the State's claim against a third party
whether or not the Medicaid recipient expressly
excludes the State's claim from his own action or
negotiations, putting the third party on notice that,
in the absence of the State's written consent, the
State will not be bound by any representations made
by a Medicaid recipient as to whether the State's
claim is included, nor will the State be bound by
any release of claims signed by a Medicaid
recipient.
[16] \ 46 We do not interpret this court's opinion
in McCoy as mandating a contrary conclusion. The
language in McCoy that might be read to suggest
that the express exclusion is necessary to preserve
the State's claim appears in a footnote, which
refutes the State's argument that McCoy was not
entitled to attorney fees because he failed to
cooperate with the State. 2000 UT 39, \ 18 n. 4,
999 P.2d 572. Had we recognized in that footnote
that the State's claim was preserved regardless of
McCoy's express exclusion, our conclusion would
have been the same. In McCoy, this court stressed
that "it would be inherently unfair not to award
attorney fees to McCoy" where he had not only
requested and been denied the State's consent, but
to Oris. U.S. Govt. Works.
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had also taken the additional step of excluding the
State's claim. Id. ^ 18. As we have explained,
however, this exclusion was entirely unnecessary to
preserve the State's claim, and principles of fairness
thus demand that the State pay its share of attorney
fees whether or not the Medicaid recipient's
attorney expressly excludes the State's claim.
Indeed, we noted in McCoy that the express
exclusion itself leads to an unfair result whenever
the State chooses, as it may, to recover its paid
expenses from the proceeds gained through the
efforts of the Medicaid recipient's attorney rather
than through its own independent action. In such a
situation, the State receives the money to which it is
entitled, but the Medicaid recipient's net recovery is
effectively reduced by that amount, and the liable
third party entirely escapes responsibility for what it
should have paid to *873 the State. See id. U 18
n. 5; id. f 22 (Durham, J., concurring).
[17] U 47 In Straight, 2004 UT 88, 108 P.3d 690,
this court distinguished the facts of the case before
it from the facts in McCoy, partly on the basis that
the attorney for Streight, unlike McCoy, had not.
expressly excluded the State's claim from the action
that he filed. See id. ffij 10, 13. However, the
court's concern in Streight, more broadly described,
was that an attorney has "[complied with the Act
by] requesting] consent and has done nothing to
prejudice the State's right to recover its Medicaid
payments." Id. U 9. To date, this court has yet to
analyze whether a Medicaid recipient's failure to
expressly exclude the State's claim necessarily
prejudices the State's right to recover. We now do
so and conclude that it does not.
K 48 The statutory scheme enacted by the
legislature grants the State maximum flexibility in
recovering its Medicaid expenses. It allows the
State to
(1) take action directly against the third party, for
which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant
consent to recipients seeking to pursue the State's
claim, whereby the State's recovery will be reduced
by reasonable attorney fees and, if any, its
proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3)
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient
after the recipient recovers from the third party, in
which case the State's recovery shall be reduced by
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

reasonable attorney fees.
McCoy, 2000 UT 39, <[ 19, 999 P.2d 572.
Because the State's flexibility is in no way reduced
by a Medicaid recipient's failure to expressly
exclude the State's claims from his own negotiations
or complaint, there is no justification for requiring
express exclusion as a prerequisite to the State's
obligation to pay its share of attorney fees. Indeed,
imposing such a requirement would serve only to
benefit a liable third party at the expense of the
Medicaid recipient. We accordingly hold that the
State's obligation to pay its share of attorney fees is
not dependent upon whether the recipient expressly
excluded the State's claim but, rather, is dependent
upon whether the recipient requested consent and
whether the State's recovery was attributable to the
efforts of the recipient's attorney.
K 49 Accordingly, in all cases where the State
satisfies its lien from proceeds procured through the
efforts of a private attorney, the State is responsible
for its proportionate share of attorney fees if the
recipient or his attorney requested consent from the
State. This is so regardless of whether the State
satisfies its lien from funds recovered by the
recipient or whether it recovers directly from a
liable third party. Moreover, in those cases where
a settlement or judgment is obtained through the
efforts of a private attorney, any claim by the State
that it recovered its lien through its own efforts will
be subject to scrutiny. The State will not be able to
establish that it recovered its lien through its own
efforts simply by showing that it sent notification of
its lien to potentially liable third parties with the
expectation that they will pay the State directly
from the settlement proceeds generated through the
efforts of a recipient's private attorney. To avoid
paying its fair share of attorney fees after it has
refused to grant consent, the State must demonstrate
that its lien was paid wholly independent of the
settlement or judgment procured by the recipient's
private attorney.

IV. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY ORDER
H 50 We now turn to the scope of the discovery
order. The district court limited discovery to that
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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which "relates solely to the class issues" and
authorized plaintiffs to "pursue the identification of
recipients who fall within the holding of the McCoy
case." Because the district court adopted an
erroneously narrow view of our holding in McCoy,
it necessarily follows that it unduly restricted the
scope of discovery. We accordingly remand this
case to the district court with instructions to modify
the scope of the discovery order consistent with this
opinion.

TJ 51 The district court erred in limiting McCoy to
its narrow, fact-specific ruling. Under the general
holding of McCoy, the State is obligated to pay its
share of a recipient's private attorney fees if either
(1) the *874 State consents to the recipient's request
to represent its interest; or (2) the State satisfies its
lien from proceeds procured through the efforts of a
recipient's private attorney in those cases where the
recipient requested, but was denied, consent. We
remand the case to the district court with*
instructions to modify the scope of the discovery
order accordingly.
U 52 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Judge
ORME concur in Justice PARRISH's opinion.
TJ 53 Having disqualified himself, Justice
NEHRING does not participate herein; Court of
Appeals Judge GREGORY K. ORME sat.
Utah,2005.
Houghton v. Department of Health
125 P.3d 860, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 2005 UT 63
END OF DOCUMENT
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H

R.App. P. 4(d). Under the plain language of rule
4(d), Carsten's notice of cross-appeal was untimely.
See id. As a result, this court lacks jurisdiction over
the cross-appeal. SeeGlezos v. Frontier Invs., 826
P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah Ct.App.1995).
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Cheryl Carsten seeks to cross-appeal the trial
court's order dated January 24, 2006. This is before
the court on its own motion for summary
disposition based on the lack of jurisdiction due to
an untimely filed notice of cross-appeal.
It is undisputed that Carsten filed her notice of
cross-appeal fifteen days after Brian Carsten filed
his notice of appeal. Pursuant to rule 4(d), if a party
files a timely notice of appeal, "any other party may
file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed."Utah
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

Carsten asserts that her notice of cross-appeal was
timely because three days should be added to the
time period to file under rule 22 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. SeeUtah R.App. P. 22(d).
The filing of notices of appeal and cross-appeal,
however, are beyond the scope of rule 22. Pursuant
to rule 22, when a party "is required or permitted to
do an act within a prescribed period after service of
a paper and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall
be added to the prescribed period."/*/. By its plain
language, rule 22 extends the time to respond to
documents only where the time runs from the "
service of [the] paper." Id.
The time for filing a notice of cross-appeal,
however, runs from the date of the filing of the
notice of appeal. SeeUtah R.App. P. 4(d). Because
the time does not run from the service of the notice
of appeal, but from the filing of it in court, rule 22
does not apply. Therefore, Carsten's notice of
cross-appeal was untimely.
When a court lacks jurisdiction over a cross-appeal,
it must dismiss the cross-appeal. SeeBradbury v.
Valencia, 2000 UT 50, | 8, 5 P.3d 649.
Accordingly, this cross-appeal is dismissed.
Utah App.,2006.
Carsten v. Carsten
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1791391 (Utah
App.), 2006 UT App 275
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